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Abstract  
This research focuses on the design of a procurement model for expensive medical supplies 
in a healthcare supply chain. A deterministic optimization model generates 
recommendations for optimal purchases of products in a given planning period. The model 
combines common concepts of supply chain procurement such as leveraging tiered pricing, 
ensuring supply base diversity with phenomena unique to healthcare supply chain such as 
consideration of physician preference for products. The deterministic optimization model 
minimizes total spend over a chosen planning period with consideration of four key 
decision parameters: 
• Physician preference requirements (which are imposed as rules on product 
substitutability), 
• Upper limits on vendor market share to ensure a suitably diverse supply base 
• Vendors’ performance scores to impose standards for product pricing, quality, 
service, etc. 
• Quantity discount rebate parameters for bulk purchasing to help contain medical 
costs 
The optimization model reveals the extent to which higher product substitutability and 
lower supply base diversity may help hospitals reduce total procurement costs.  
Experiments with the optimization model also reveal the potential consequences of rater 
biases in vendor scorecards on procurement cost. The various parameter combinations 
listed above may be used in negotiating contracts for better pricing.  
In summary, this research addresses questions pertinent to healthcare supply chains 
concerning the possible cost of physician preference for products, the impact of subjective 
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scorecards on procurement costs, the effect of planning period on procurement plans, and 
the cost of vendor diversity.  
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1 Introduction 
Cost management is an area of concern for healthcare providers in a sector of the USA 
economy, which as of early 2018, exceeds 18% of GDP (Papinicolas et al., 2018). A 2018 
survey of 140 healthcare providers and suppliers revealed that cost management 
specifically through supply chain savings was the top trending issue of concern in 
healthcare supply chain management (Schiller, 2018). In the USA, costs connected with 
expensive medical device waste alone, have been estimated to be $5 billion annually 
(DiChiaria, 2016).  Given that medical supplies are the second largest expense for 
healthcare organizations (surpassed only by labor expense), it is easy to see why supply 
cost management is challenging (Belliveau, J., 2017).  
Medical supplies can be classified into two categories - Physician Preference Items 
(PPIs) such as implants, defibrillators, pacemakers etc. and commodity items such as 
bandages, syringes etc. Commodity-item purchases are usually handled by procurement 
teams without involvement of physicians. PPIs however follow a different purchasing path. 
In fact, the supply chain for PPIs begins with the physicians themselves since they tend to 
select the products and then advise procurement personnel which products should be 
purchased (Finn, T., 2015). The resulting PPI purchases can occur without pre-negotiated 
contracts, resulting in variations in purchasing price, fewer savings opportunities, and 
higher healthcare costs (Belliveau, J., 2017). Physicians’ preference expressed as an 
unwillingness to consider using an equally effective alternative device can be considered 
an element of a supply chain risk given that it reduces flexibility and speed of supply chain 
responses to product backorders, recalls, and long-term disruptions in the supply chain.     
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Regardless of type of product being purchased, procurement channels in healthcare 
are changing. Historically, hospitals participated in group purchasing organizations 
(GPOs) to leverage aggregate purchasing volumes. This helped them achieve quantity 
discounts with medical device manufacturers.  Recently, however some healthcare systems 
are noticing that withdrawing from GPOs enables them to avoid administrative fees and 
negotiate contracts directly with manufacturers more efficiently. Reciprocally, medical 
device manufacturers think the GPOs are doing a lackluster job of conveying the 
uniqueness of their products to hospitals, leading them to prefer direct engagement with 
the hospitals (Kacik, 2018).  There is also a certain degree of mistrust towards GPOs 
resulting from anti-trust and anti-kickback lawsuits from the early 2000s. (Weinstein, B.L., 
2006). These changes in perception of GPOs have created an inconsistent relationship 
between hospitals and GPOs, making contract negotiations a more localized hospital-level 
effort (McKone et al., 2016). Healthcare organizations have recognized that supply-chain 
management personnel can help in replacing GPO functions and effectively negotiate 
contracts for PPIs and commodity items.  
To operationalize the chosen procurement strategy – specifically one where contracts 
are designed without GPO leverage – an organization has to first determine a pool of 
qualifying vendors. Scorecards are a common tool used to assess vendor performance and 
select this pool of vendors. Variants of balanced scorecards first proposed by Kaplan and 
Norton (1992) can be used for vendor evaluation and selection (Galankashi et al., 2016). 
The balanced scorecard proposes the use of joint financial and operational measures for 
performance measurement. Organizations use these joint measures to seek a mix of 
desirable characteristics such as cost competitiveness, reliable customer service etc. in their 
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vendor pool. Performance is evaluated by teams of internal members who routinely deal 
with the vendor’s representatives or the vendor’s processes through interactions such as 
contract negotiations, purchase order activities, billing, and inventory management. For 
such evaluations organizations often use various objective and subjective ratings. A 
healthcare organization, for example, may value a vendor who provides access to 
innovative medical technology through their product offerings, more than one who offers 
the cheapest product.  However if cost reduction is a critical goal for a hospital, they may 
seek opportunities to “cherry-pick” vendors that offer the cheapest product in a category, 
as long as the products meet quality specifications while trying to ensure that minimal 
vendor performance standards are achieved on all dimensions. It should be noted that the 
introduction of scorecards in the procurement process changes behavior on both sides of 
the table given their potential effect on market shares and diversification strategies. This 
makes scorecards an important consideration in strategic sourcing. Subjective scorecards 
can however be sensitive to the biases of the raters creating them. In extreme cases, price 
competitive vendors may not be selected due to the whims of raters who cannot fairly judge 
vendor capabilities. Losing these vendors can increase procurement costs. A study of the 
effects of possible rater biases, is thus in order, when creating an optimization model that 
includes subjective scorecards as a primary consideration in its design. 
For procurement to be a truly strategic function in healthcare, it should address all 
the aforementioned considerations, namely physician preference, cost control, nuances of 
vendor performance measurement, and supply base diversification. Procurement teams 
often face dilemmas about sourcing products given that accommodating diversification and 
physician preference requirements may actually lead to higher procurements costs. It is 
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easy to see why healthcare organizations are phasing out conventional reactive planning in 
favor of proactive planning to address these supply chain issues and risks (Kırılmaz & Erol, 
2017). Needed for such planning are analytical tools that can help healthcare organizations 
explore alternative strategies and demonstrate the costs of various procurement constraints. 
The optimization model presented in this research is one such analytical tool.  
1.1 Research Questions 
The objective of this dissertation is to provide guidance for procurement processes 
and effective contract negotiations by using mathematical modeling. This is achieved 
through creating a mixed integer linear programming model for identifying a procurement 
strategy that takes advantage of bulk-buy discounts while ensuring a sufficiently diversified 
supply to mitigate risk of outages for critical items from appropriate vendors.  
Q1:  What is the expected cost of adhering strictly to physicians’ preferences on product? 
It is axiomatic that with similar patient outcomes, eliminating or reducing reliance 
on physician preference could lead to lower supply-chain cost. However, the 
impact/magnitude of such changes has not been studied in academia.  This dissertation 
examines the tradeoffs between physician preference and supply chain cost for critical 
items in a healthcare supply chain. 
 
Q2: What is the expected cost of forcing diversification among vendors as a risk mitigation 
strategy? 
Employing vendor diversification as a risk-mitigation strategy may force an 
organization to purchase product from vendors that do not offer the lowest price. The extra 
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costs may depend on the organization’s tolerance for risk of stockouts.  Yang et al (2012) 
contend that diversification in suppliers usually comes at a high price due to loss of pricing 
concessions.   A study conducted by Burke (2007) concluded that single sourcing was an 
effective strategy only when supplier capacities were large relative to the product demand 
and when the firm did not obtain diversification benefits. This dissertation researches these 
tradeoffs in a study of selected critical items in a case study of a healthcare supply chain. 
 
Q3: What is the effect of subjective scorecards on procurement processes? 
Balanced scorecards are popular tools used to assess vendor performance but they 
are often subjective and may reflect the rater’s biases towards the vendors. The effect of 
scorecards on cost savings and market share have not been studied in healthcare 
procurement processes. If subjective scorecards become explicit factors to be considered 
in procurement decisions, we need to be aware of their possible consequences.  This 
dissertation addresses this gap in academic research through experiments with different 
structures of common-methods variance among scorecard ratings and assesses their impact 
on procurement costs. 
 
Q4: How would procurement strategies and purchasing costs change if contracts were 
negotiated on an annual basis instead of a quarterly basis? 
Bulk purchases can be negotiated at differing fixed planning intervals such as 
annually or quarterly. Depending on the historic demand data available, an annual plan can 
be created for one annual purchase or quarterly demand data can be used to create four 
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quarterly suggested purchases a year. The MILP model is used to test if optimization 
models are sensitive to the two different demand aggregation levels.  
 
1.2 Research methodology 
 
To investigate the research questions, a literature review was first conducted to seek 
relevant topics in academic research related to the application of deterministic optimization 
models in strategic sourcing and mathematical modeling of healthcare supply chain issues. 
Reputable non-academic publications were reviewed to identify major trends and issues in 
healthcare supply chain to ensure the relevance of the work presented here. Feedback from 
the healthcare organization used as the study setting was also used to establish relevance. 
The literature review helped identify gaps in research in this field and confirmed that the 
research presented here is rigorous in its methodology, addressed knowledge voids, and is 
relevant to practice. 
Next, data collection exercises were conducted for the product information. Also, 
sample scorecards were completed by supply chain managers to allow us to study the rating 
process and have sample scorecard data for the rater bias simulation. 
From an analytical methodology standpoint, a mixed integer linear programming 
model was employed to create the procurement planning tool in SAS 9.4. Parameters for 
physician preference, rebate percentage, bulk buy level percentage, maximum vendor 
market share, and minimum scorecard requirements were stipulated in the model. In this 
dissertation, we first discuss the formulation of the optimization model, followed by testing 
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of the model parameters to ensure appropriate model behavior under various parameter 
combinations.  
When this study was conducted, the healthcare organization was in the process of 
finalizing vendor scorecards to be used necessitating the use of hypothetical scorecard data 
in this study. To ensure the scorecards were accurately reflective of an actual scorecard 
that might be used, we generated the hypothetical scorecards by using a mathematical 
model. Nuances of the scoring procedure were captured through observations of score 
assignment by the supply chain managers who completed the sample scorecards. Using 
these observations, we simulated the sequence with which scores would be assigned and 
we emulated the scoring procedure with a mathematical model designed to generate scores 
with hypothesized correlation structures and tendencies of raters to give high or low scores.  
The various scorecards structures emerging from these simulations were used in our 
experiments to answer the relevant research questions. Finally, experiments are conducted 
to test the effects of scorecard ratings and planning period on the optimization model. 
 
1.3 Dissertation Outline 
The remainder of this dissertation is arranged as follows. Chapter 2 contains a review of 
literature related to the evolution of supplier selection models and healthcare sourcing, and 
identifies the research gaps which motivate the purposes of this research. . Chapters 3 & 4 
present the analytical framework and design and discussion of the deterministic MILP 
optimization model. Chapter 5 discusses the various experiments done using the model. 
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Chapter 6 summarizes the research findings, provides managerial insights, discusses the 
limitations of the research, and identifies areas for fruitful future extensions to this research. 
 15 
 
2 Literature Review 
2  
Singh et al. (2017) define strategic sourcing as the process of evaluating, selecting, and 
aligning with vendors/suppliers to achieve operational improvements to achieve an 
organization’s strategic objectives. Strategic sourcing has been known to improve the 
resiliency of a supply chain against various disruptions, especially when procuring critical 
products (Arani et al., 2016). As early as 1980, leading procurement organizations had 
begun exploring sourcing strategies such as corporate buying, supply base optimization, 
total supply chain cost minimization, and goods and services value maximization 
(Anderson and Katz, 1998). This initial research combined with interest in leveraging 
operations research methodologies for procurement, led to the advancement of 
mathematical optimization for strategic sourcing in manufacturing and retail business 
settings. The use of these optimization models in the service industry however have 
received attention only recently. In healthcare specifically, operations research 
methodologies have been used to address issues such as demand forecasting, location 
decisions, emergency vehicle routing, capacity planning, procurement decisions, 
scheduling decisions, patient and clinician scheduling, resource allocation (including drug 
allocation and personnel allocation), and supply chain co-ordination (Rais and Viana, 
2011). Of these areas, procurement processes still rely heavily on reactive planning 
strategies, instead of proactive planning strategies. Given the large number of hospitals that 
outsource purchasing activities (especially for commodity goods), there is a lack of 
research examining the use of strategic sourcing to establish cost efficient, sustainable 
procurement in healthcare (Knight et al., 2017). The research presented here recognizes 
this gap and proposes the use of deterministic optimization, for design of a sourcing 
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strategy for healthcare. The reference literature used in this dissertation, to identify research 
gaps, can be found in publications that discuss studies related to supply chain management, 
supply chain risk management, healthcare management, and more specifically healthcare 
procurement practices.  
Quantitative models for strategic sourcing generally address (1) from whom 
(vendors/suppliers) particular products should be bought, (2) from whom products should 
be bought and in what quantities (i.e. market share allocation), and (3) the aforementioned 
decisions with consideration of the subsequent risk, after sales service, etc. A fourth 
research theme is the inquiry of the aforementioned procurement decisions in service 
supply chains instead of manufacturing supply chains. Table 1 summarizes the most 
relevant prior research by these prevailing themes. 
Table 1: Summary of most relevant prior research 
Single and multi-attribute supplier selection 
Lee and Chien (2014) 
Choudhary and Shankar 
(2014) Kamali et al. (2011) 
Talluri et al. (2008) 
Talluri and Narasimhan 
(2003) Bui et al. (2001) 
 Supplier selection and market share allocation 
Kannan et al. (2013) Chai et al. (2012) 
Rothkopf & Whinston 
(2009) 
Sandholm (2007) Burke et al. (2007) (Metty, 2005) 
Parlar and Wang (1993)  Pan (1989)  
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Addressing risk management in strategic sourcing 
Rao et al. (2017) DuHadway et al. (2017)  Mavi et al. (2016) 
Sawik (2014) Bunker et al. (2016) Gandhi et al. (2012) 
Paul (2015)  
Braunscheidel and Suresh 
(2009) Babich et al. (2007) 
Burke et al. (2007) Tomlin (2006) Ding et al (2005) 
Finch (2004) 
Giunipero and Eltantawy 
(2004) Kumar et al. (2003) 
Procurement decisions in service industry supply chains 
Kros et al. (2018) Knight et al. (2017) Karsak and Dursun (2015) 
Wang et al. (2015) Ravindran et al (2010) Jacobsen et al. (1999) 
 
A review of literature in the area of quantitative models for procurement indicates 
that such models generally range from cost based approaches (focused on minimizing and 
competing on cost) to multi attribute formulations that explore attributes beyond pricing 
competitiveness. In general, most supplier selection and supplier evaluation models use 
either an Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP) approach, which rates suppliers depending 
on their characteristics such as delivery, quality, pricing etc. or a total cost of ownership 
approach (Paul, 2015, and Bhutta & Huq, 2002). Along with literature on supplier 
selection, two academic publications, Ho et al. (2010) and Fahimnia et al. (2015) are 
reviewed to trace the evolution of research on quantitative risk management models that 
may be employed when selecting vendors and negotiating contracts. Both these 
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publications are recent literature reviews that summarized well-cited works in this area of 
research.  
Ho et al. (2010) reviewed 78 journal articles from 2000 – 2008 with the intent to 
discover which approaches were most prevalent in studying multi-criteria supplier 
evaluation/selection, which evaluation criteria were most common and if there was an 
inadequacy in the approaches/criteria. In response to the first question (i.e. most prevalent 
approaches), the authors discovered that Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) and 
mathematical programming (integer linear/non-linear and goal programming) were  the 
most common approaches to determine the optimal number of suppliers and optimal order 
quantities. These approaches used both quantitative and qualitative measures as evaluation 
criteria. The most common among these (in line with the authors’ second investigative 
question) were quality, delivery, price/cost, manufacturing capability and service. The 
authors concluded from DEA that price (a traditional single criterion) is neither sufficient 
nor robust enough alone to evaluate suppliers. DEA was judged to be a confusing approach 
for practitioners since real business objectives were not used as the evaluation criteria.  
Fahimnia et al. (2015) conducted an analysis of quantitative models (mathematical, 
optimization and simulation) employed for supply chain risk management (SCRM) in a 
review of 1108 journal articles (initial search resulted in 2304 publications, which was 
reduced to a final sample of 1104 relevant papers) published between 1978- 2013. The 
bibliometric analysis conducted using BibExcel consisted of a wide search of terms 
referring to supply chain risk. The authors discovered that there is a lack of uniform 
definitions and terminology in SCRM; hence they searched literature over a wider time 
period and range of journals compared to Ho et al (2010). Top contributing journals were 
Parimal Kulkarni 
University of Missouri, St. Louis 
 
19 
 
International Journal of Production Research and International Journal of Production 
Economics. Of the eight key research clusters/topics identified, six topic clusters were 
about supply uncertainty, demand uncertainty, uncertainty modeling in operational 
planning, uncertainty modeling in facility location, uncertainty modeling in inventory 
management and uncertainty in purchasing and retail sourcing. From a review of the top 
contributing journals noted the authors noted that most research is concentrated in 
manufacturing and industrial settings, leaving a SCRM research gap for service industries. 
Ho et al. (2010) and Fahiminia et al. (2015) both highlight the opportunity to study supply 
chain risk management especially for procurement in service industries like healthcare.  
A more in-depth look into the papers cited in articles by the Ho et al (2010) and 
Fahiminia et al (2015) highlights the foundational set of papers for this dissertation.  
2.1 Early work on single and multi-attribute supplier selection 
A summary of research on supplier selection models was provided by Kannan et 
al. (2013) as shown in Figure 1. Their review extended the work presented by Chai et al. 
(2012) regarding decision making techniques for supplier selection. Through a review of 
123 journal articles published from 2008 to 2012, the most frequently used technique for 
supplier selection was found to be Analytical Hierarchical process (AHP), followed by 
linear programming (LP) and Technique for Order of Preference by Similarity to Ideal 
Solution (TOPSIS). 
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Figure 1: Summary of supplier selection methods (Source: Kannan et al., 2013) 
The initial work in the area of quantitative models for supplier selection mainly 
focused on price as a selection criterion and generally tried to minimize cost without 
consideration of the risk management. There was some discussion of tradeoffs between 
diversification and favorable pricing, but articles focused mainly on total cost as the only 
criterion in supplier selection. Bui et al. (2001) contend that negotiations should optimize 
both buyer and supplier interests by addressing quantitative and qualitative attributes such 
as product quality, speed, reputation, after sales service, etc. Research on quantitative 
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models for market share allocation and contract negotiation indicates that such models 
generally range from cost based approaches (focused on minimizing and competing on 
cost) to multi attribute models that explore supplier qualities beyond pricing 
competitiveness. A supplier that provides the best price, for example, may not provide the 
necessary flexibility in volume and delivery time in case of an adverse event. Poor 
historical performance regarding timeliness and quality signal risks of disruption. Further, 
the attributes that make a vendor attractive in a portfolio (e.g., to diversify risk) may differ 
from the prime attributes that qualified the vendor to be on the supplier list (Lee and Chien, 
2014). 
Lee and Chien (2014) highlighted four general issues with vendor/ supplier 
selection problem. Firstly, the objectives that are considered in evaluating vendor portfolios 
(e.g. risk diversification) usually differ from the objectives considered in selecting an 
individual vendor. Secondly, Lee and Chien (2014) claim that vendors selected in a 
portfolio are usually interrelated and their interrelation is generally not modeled. Thirdly, 
it is difficult to clarify the correlation among vendor selection criteria and performance 
measures (e.g. quality can be both a selection criteria and performance measure) and 
according to Lee and Chien (2014) this makes the mathematical modeling of vendor 
selection difficult. Lastly, in general vendor selection problems tend to be large scale 
problems if an extensive list of selection goals is used. From observations in practice, 
vendors in a selected portfolio may be competitors but are rarely interrelated. Further, 
market shares are allocated assuming vendor independence. Hence, this dissertation does 
not model vendor interrelation. 
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Other academicians have also voiced the need for multi-attribute models which 
look beyond pricing flexibility. Talluri and Narasimhan (2003) proposed to minimize 
variability in supplier performance instead of minimizing total cost.  Two linear 
programming models were developed to maximize productivity, which was defined to 
include quality and delivery in addition to price. In an extension of their work, Talluri et 
al. (2008) performed data envelopment analysis (DEA) to rate the efficiency of suppliers 
(efficiency defined as better output for least input) were chosen. The model was novel in 
its approach of offering distinctive negotiations with efficient versus inefficient suppliers.  
They recommended that a larger set of attributes be considered for such models. In this 
dissertation, the set of attributes is extended to include innovation and operational 
excellence, which represent the vendor’s ability to provide the hospitals with information 
regarding new product pipeline and opportunities to improve supply chain operations.  
Quantity discounts are the biggest drivers of contract negotiations, and suppliers 
offering such deals are more favored than their peers. Amongst the works that account for 
quantity discounts in the supplier selection models, the Kamali et al. (2011) study is notable 
in that it incorporated quantity discount policies in tandem with joint cost reduction while 
developing their model for supplier selection. The proposed non-linear multi-objective 
mixed integer programming model minimized the total system cost which included both 
the buyer and the supplier’s annual cost. To extend the supplier selection criteria beyond 
pricing, the authors also considered total purchasing (production) value, total late 
deliveries, and total defective items. The objective function was set up as a goal 
programming problem for multiple objectives where the deviation from all goals was 
minimized. Weights were assigned to each supplier selection criteria related to quality and 
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delivery. The authors found that the objective function was highly sensitive to the changes 
in demand, production rates, variable costs, defective rates, and late delivery rates. 
Further review of more recent literature provides examples of studies that use 
pricing as a main criterion for supplier selection but may also incorporate other quality 
related goals. An example of such a study is the goal programming modeling conducted by 
Choudhary and Shankar (2014) in a manufacturing setting for joint decision making of 
inventory lot sizing (i.e. order allocation), supplier selection and carrier selection which 
incorporated an additional factor of transportation costs. Three variations of goal 
programming (pre-emptive, non-preemptive and weighted max-min fuzzy logic) were used 
to design a model that minimized three goals; net rejected items, net delayed deliveries, 
and purchasing, inventory and transportation costs. In this study suppliers were not ranked 
by their attributes of delivery and quality metrics. These attributes were however used as 
goals in addition to the primary purchasing goal. The authors presented trade-offs between 
service level requirements and total costs incurred and found that higher service levels 
resulted in higher total costs. They found that the pre-emptive and weighted max-min fuzzy 
models were more sensitive to the weights assigned to the goals than the non-preemptive 
model.  
2.2 Supplier selection and market share allocation  
Going beyond just optimal supplier selection, there are studies which focused on 
both supplier selection and market share allocation decisions. To leverage quantity 
discounts offered by vendors, careful decisions have to be made regarding the market share 
allocated to each vendor.  Vendor market shares are finalized via contract negotiations on 
either a quarterly or annual basis and they determine the various usage tiers that qualify an 
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organization for quantity discounts. Studies that recognize the importance of dynamic 
market share allocation provide a more wholesome look at procurement decisions. Most 
interesting research in this area, is the work conducted by Motorola Inc. to improve their 
supplier contract negotiation using a MIP model wherein they optimized contract awards 
across sectors with various suppliers (Metty, 2005). To optimize their e-auctions the model 
minimized a function of price associated with a bid and quantity. Variables representing 
non-price attributes that affect pricing such that supplier quality and reputation were 
introduced using constraints. As an example, the tool optimized an auction with over 200 
items, over 700 bids, and over a hundred constraints and allocated the contract award to 
each winning supplier for each item category. Electronic auctions have been the latest 
development in strategic sourcing, replacing negotiations and decreasing transactions 
costs. Though they have offered the buyers leverage by providing web based analytical 
technology, e-auctions have sometimes faced resistance from suppliers as they have 
replaced face-to-face negotiations and interactions. (Rothkopf & Whinston, 2009).  Within 
e-auctions, a subset of research focuses on combinatorial auctions for procuring items from 
multiple suppliers (Sandholm, 2007). These allow the bidders and buyers to express 
constraints about complementarity and substitutability among items in a bid. Optimization 
methods in this research area minimize cost of bids while constraining the size of the bids. 
Constraints for discounts and supplier diversity were added to these optimizations as well. 
Procurement methods that apply web based technology generally allow the user to create 
constraints instead of embedding them in the optimization model. There is a large body of 
work about e-auctions and the modeling involved; it is however outside the scope of 
relevant discussion here. 
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Kannan et al. (2013) designed a fuzzy multi attribute, multi-objective model for 
rating and selecting suppliers according to economic and environmental criteria, and then 
allocating the optimum market share to each supplier. The two objectives of the model 
were to simultaneously maximize the total purchasing value and minimize the total cost of 
purchasing. Using an Iranian auto manufacturer as a study setting, a fuzzy AHP was used 
to calculate the relative weights for three suppliers for the following selection criteria - 
Cost, quality, delivery, technological capability, and environmental competency. Using 
survey methodology, the criteria were ranked and a fuzzy pair-wise comparison matrix of 
the criteria was built. Next, using fuzzy Technique for Order of Preference by Similarity 
to Ideal Solution (TOPSIS), suppliers were ranked using the weighted criteria. Finally, the 
weights of the criteria and ranks of suppliers were incorporated into a multi-objective linear 
programming model to determine the optimal order quantity from each supplier while 
being subjected to resource constraints. Costs considered in the study were unit holding 
cost, unit price, order/setup cost, and unit transportation cost. The model’s sensitivity was 
analyzed by varying weights for the two objectives. Further, changing the weights of the 
criteria helped reflect the organizations priorities of desirable supplier characteristics.  
Other notable studies closely related to supplier selection and contract allocations 
are those conducted by Pan (1989), Parlar and Wang (1993) and Burke et al. (2007). Pan 
(1989) proposed a linear programming model to optimally identify the number of suppliers 
and their respective quantity allocations to meet pre-specified product requirements. The 
objective was to minimize the price per unit as a weighted average of selected suppliers’ 
prices, where product demand was deterministic and supply was unlimited. Parlar and 
Wang (1993) studied strategic sourcing (single source vs multiple sources) by comparing 
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the costs of single versus dual sourcing for a firm assuming that the overall objective was 
to minimize purchasing and inventory related costs. They used an EOQ and newsboy based 
ordering policy and demonstrated that dual sourcing was preferred when supplier yield was 
a random variable. Burke et al. (2007) extended the Parlar and Wang (1993) study by 
implementing an optimization approach to determine whether a product should be single 
sourced or sourced from multiple suppliers depending on demand uncertainty. The authors 
concluded that single sourcing was as effective strategy only when diversification offered 
no benefits and the supplier capacities were larger than the product demand. 
2.3 Addressing risk management in strategic sourcing  
Sawik (2014) had noted that the academic research on sourcing decisions such as 
supplier selection and quantity allocation under disruption type risk is very limited. Though 
supply chain risk management related research has grown in the last few years, it is 
primarily focused on the manufacturing supply chain much like the literature for supplier 
selection in general.  
Risks associated with sourcing can be either strategic or operational. Researchers 
have found that the prevalence of either type of risk depends on industry and the very 
definition of risk categories (Bunker et al. 2016, Gandhi et al., 2012). This dissertation 
focuses on the risks associated with operationalizing a chosen sourcing strategy, where the 
sourcing strategy may cause disruptions due to the variabilities in daily operations. One 
strategic risk under consideration is the risk of negative financial outcome, which presents 
itself if quantity discount levels are not met due to physician preference for certain medical 
devices. Physician preference is the physicians’ reluctance to use substitutable, comparable 
products from alternate vendors.  The other risks considered by this dissertation are 
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operational risks.  Examples of operational risk are the risk of service disruption, the risk 
of poor service quality, and risk of service level agreement failures (Bunker et al. 2016). 
These operational risks have also been classified as performance failure disruption type 
risks by DuHadway et al. (2017). The authors defined performance failure type disruptions 
as those occurring due to an inadvertent act that occurs within the supply chain itself. The 
authors’ recommended risk detection methods were supplier audits and supplier 
development. Rao et al. (2017) also recommended that better supplier evaluation and 
selection, can effectively reduce a chain’s operational risk. Supplier scorecards are often 
used to keep track of supplier performance and are a good supplier audit tool. This 
dissertation uses a relevant scorecard to account for the supplier characteristics that may 
indicate the risk presented by unacceptable supplier performance. DuHadway et al. (2017) 
in their literature review found that risk can be reduced by using reliable suppliers (Tomlin 
2006), and creating a risk management processes (Finch, 2004). They further found that 
needed for disruption recovery, are a multiple sourcing strategy (Giunipero and Eltantawy, 
2004) and suppliers with volume flexibility (Braunscheidel and Suresh, 2009). Though 
these studies do explore the theory behind supply chain risk management, they lack 
quantitative models that can be implemented in practice.  
Studies that do take a mathematical modeling approach to the process of supplier 
selection in the context of supply chain risk management, utilize a supplier selection 
criteria, a weighting criteria for supplier ranking, and a classification of the risks to be 
considered in the selection process. Two recent works by Paul (2015) and Mavi et al. 
(2016) use a fuzzy model approach discussed a fuzzy model approach for strategic sourcing 
(specifically supplier selection) so as to manage supply chain risk. Paul (2015) identified 
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eighteen qualitative and quantitative selection criteria (the sources of this selection is 
unclear, it may have been from literature and/or practice) with three verbal rankings for 
each criteria; low, medium and high. The quantitative criteria were; percentages of 
defective items, percentage of delayed deliveries, average annual price increment and lead 
time. The qualitative criteria were supplier’s demand flexibility, adequacy of transport, 
adequacy of inventory management, environmental performance, financial stability, 
response to technological change, reputation, adequacy of disruption management, 
compliance standards, and information technology system, commitment to quality, ability 
to respond to unexpected demand, commitment to continuous improvement, and ability to 
meet specifications. Hypothetical data were used for five suppliers. A total of 168 rules 
were created in a Matlab module for the fuzzy optimization algorithm that related input 
(selection criterion) to output (ranking). An example, stated by Paul (2015, p.662) for a 
rule is “if the demand flexibility is high, the supplier ranking index is very high, and (ii) if 
the percentage of defective items is high, the supplier ranking index is very low.” Multiple 
combinations of the various rankings were computed by the program and a supplier was 
recommended. The acknowledgement of risk of conducting business with a particular 
supplier was quantified in the form of a couple of supplier selection criteria (financial 
stability, adequacy of disruption management). The other incorporation of uncertainty in 
the model was by considering triangular and Gaussian membership functions for the input 
and output variables. Mavi et al (2016) recommend using fuzzy multiple attribute decision-
making methods given the inaccuracy in assessing the relative importance of supplier 
attributes and performance ratings. The authors further recommend using Shannon entropy 
for weighting the selection criteria and ranking suppliers. Quality, on time delivery, 
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performance history, supply risk, demand risk, manufacturing risk, logistics risk, 
information risk, and environment risk were chosen as the supplier selection criteria. Fuzzy 
triangular numbers were generated using expert opinion to rank suppliers on each of these 
criteria. Upon weighting the criteria using Shannon entropy, demand risk was found to be 
the most important supplier selection criteria, while environmental risk was found to be the 
least important supplier selection criteria. Final recommendation on supplier ranking and 
selection was made using these weights and corresponding supplier rankings. Though 
using an interesting approach to address uncertainty created by subjectivity in selection 
criteria and ranking, neither of these studies addressed quantity allocations or 
diversification. Such studies are relevant for supplier ranking with consideration of risk, 
but inadequate for strategic sourcing. 
Another recent study on supplier selection used a combination of precise and fuzzy 
variables for supplier attributes. Rao et al. (2017) used a two-stage compound mechanism 
based on multi-attribute auction and supply-chain risk management is designed for 
selecting the suppliers. The study utilized two sets of criteria for supplier selection, namely 
commercial criteria such as quality, price, quantity, and delivery time and supply chain risk 
criteria such as technology risk, information risk, management risk, economic risk, 
environmental risk, societal risk, and ethical risk. All the commercial attributes were 
precise numbers whereas the risk attributes were coded as linguistic fuzzy numbers i.e. 
potential, low, medium, and high. A multi-attribute decision making mechanism was 
designed to select the final set of suppliers. In the first stage, the suppliers were shortlisted 
depending on how closely their bid matched the buyer’s procurement requirements. In the 
second stage, the grey correlation degree of mixing sequences was used to evaluate and 
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rank the shortlisted suppliers under the seven risk attributes and four commercial attributes. 
The study concluded that a mechanism of ranking suppliers based on the risk they present, 
would incentivize them to submit their cost and other corporate information (such as ethical 
practices) for risk evaluation. An actual case setting would be required to substantiate this 
claim.  
Lee and Chien (2014) proposed a vendor selection and order allocation 
methodology using a portfolio optimization model with consideration of risk 
diversification and delivery uncertainty. Two stochastic programming models, robust 
optimization (RO) and probabilistic models were compared. Robust optimization addresses 
parameter uncertainty such that the uncertainty model is deterministic and set based. The 
RO model was intended to produce one optimized solution for all uncertainty scenarios 
and the probabilistic model was intended to produce a solution for each scenario. The 
models required vendor diversification as a risk mitigation strategy and for competitive 
pricing. The risks in the vendor selection process were the unsystematic risk of vendor 
performance deviation and delivery uncertainty. The multi-objective optimization model 
had three objectives; maximizing overall performance of selected vendors, minimizing 
total risk, and minimizing total costs. To validate the effectiveness of the proposed two 
optimization models three strategies were compared as benchmarks: performance-oriented 
strategy, risk-oriented strategy, and the Sharpe ratio. The performance-oriented strategy 
claims that the decision maker would allocate orders to vendors in terms of performance 
ranking. The risk-oriented strategy claims that the decision maker would always like to 
minimize the risk in a portfolio regardless of cost. The Sharpe ratio suggests making a 
trade-off between performance and risk based on maximizing the return per unit of risk, 
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i.e. maximizing performance-over-risk ratio without consideration of cost. In comparing 
the results of the two models it was found that the probabilistic model always selected more 
vendors than the RO model. From a managerial standpoint, the RO model was found to be 
easier to implement since it gave a quick solution to be implemented. 
Sawik (2014) explained that supplier selection is a strategic initiative while day to 
day manufacturing order allocation is a tactical initiative. Blending of these two types of 
decision hierarchies, while introducing allowances for risk, was handled using MIP 
formulations. To model such a problem the author used a three stage supply chain (supplier, 
focal firm, customers) with probabilities for disruptions in each hierarchy and the option 
to single source or dual source materials. The risk measure is defined as “value-at-risk” 
which was a service level. The objective was to maximize customer service level and the 
expected service level in a worst case scenario. It was found from a comparison of single 
and dual sourcing strategies that for both the risk-neutral and the risk-averse solutions with 
lower confidence levels, a low price, higher risk supplier was selected to minimize cost or 
a high cost, more reliable supplier was selected for maximizing customer service. In 
general supplier reliability was found to be a more important parameter than price 
competitiveness when risk was introduced into the model. The study assumed that, though 
reliability of suppliers differed, the product they offered was comparable in quality. Sawik 
(2015) extended their earlier study by introducing cost minimization along with customer 
service level maximization under disruption risks but dropped the single and dual sourcing 
aspect of the study.  The problem was modeled as a stochastic mixed integer program with 
weighted goals.   When the objective was to minimize cost, the model resulted in the largest 
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unfulfilled demand.  When the objective was to maximize the service level, the solution 
resulted in the least unfulfilled demand. 
The Burke et al. (2007) study mentioned earlier also serves as a good example of 
modeling risk. Demand uncertainty was used in the model as a proxy for risk. They defined 
a diversification benefit function to extend the traditional newsvendor model to incorporate 
strategic diversification. In a scenario, where suppliers’ minimum order quantities are not 
fixed (unlike bulk buys where these are fixed), it was concluded that most of the product 
should be ordered from the least costly supplier with marginal amount being allocated to 
other suppliers. In a scenario, where supplier minimum order quantities are fixed (like bulk 
buys where these are fixed), flexibility of supplier may have greater bearing on selection 
than pricing flexibility. This study serves as good foundational resource for this 
dissertation. However, it focuses only on pricing as a vendor attribute in their model and 
assumes all suppliers are equally reliable. 
Babich et al. (2007) explored the trade-offs faced by a retailer between 
diversification and pricing competition, when the suppliers were market competitors and 
their business was dependent on each other. They used the theory of financial options and 
represented supply chain disruptions as a Bernoulli random variable. This analysis included 
only highly risky suppliers that could possibly default on their contractual agreement. The 
assumption in the paper was that the buyer has the option to defer ordering decisions until 
demand in the system unfolded and the supplier has the option to defer the pricing decision. 
In their model with two suppliers and deterministic demand, it was found that pricing 
benefits outweighed the diversification benefits. With more than two suppliers, Babich et 
al. (2007) found that there was a scenario where wholesale pricing as well as diversification 
Parimal Kulkarni 
University of Missouri, St. Louis 
 
33 
 
benefits could be achieved as long as two suppliers were highly co-dependent competitors. 
The analysis assumed perfect substitutability of product. In general, the authors concluded 
that pricing benefits outweigh diversification benefits. They also concluded 
(unsurprisingly) that suppliers who compete with one another would benefit from 
diversifying their customer base. This dissertation drops the constraint of studying only 
highly risky suppliers and generalizes the model to drive purchasing strategy overall. Also, 
the inclusion of physician preference as a driver of purchasing makes the dissertation 
oriented towards a specific healthcare problem. 
Kumar et al. (2003) took a fuzzy goal programming approach for vendor selection 
in a case study where data available for the goals was vague and goal values could vary. 
This introduced uncertainty into the models (with uncertainty being a proxy for risk). Three 
minimization goals were selected as vendor criteria; net cost, items returned, and late 
deliveries subject to primary constraints of vendor’s maximum capacity, flexibility in quota 
and budget allocation. Quantity discounts were not considered in the study and product 
demand was assumed to be constant with no uncertainty involved. In the scenario selected 
for study, four vendors with varying performances on each of the three goals were used. 
The fuzzy goal programming approach allocated zero quantity to the vendor with the worst 
performance on all three goals and highest quantity to the supplier with maximum supply 
capacity and average performance. The study did not consider any risk mitigation strategies 
such as diversification in the modeling efforts. 
Ding et al (2005) used a simulation-optimization approach to address the 
uncertainties associated with the supplier selection process. Following Kumar et al (2003), 
risk was modeled in the system through uncertainties in demand and lead time (e.g. 
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transportation lead-time follows normal distribution or exponential distribution). The Ding 
et al (2005) study used a Genetic Algorithm (GA) optimizer, a discrete event simulator 
(DES) and a supply chain modeling software. The ‘fitness value’ (equivalent to an 
objective function in mathematical formulation or goals in goal programming) was defined 
by the authors to be made of various KPIs of the practitioner’s choosing. In the case study 
presented by Ding et al (2005), a textile company and its suppliers are studied with the 
intention of re-designing the process of supplier selection and transportation route 
selection. The ‘fitness value’ in this case study was made of four KPIs: purchasing costs, 
transportation costs, inventory costs and penalty cost associated with total missed demands. 
The objective was set to minimize the summation of all four costs. Every supplier was 
given four attributes (FOB (Free on Board) price, duties, supply lead time, and waste ratio) 
with input from the case study and a weightage attribute that was determined by the GA 
optimization model. Various combinations of suppliers and transportation routes were 
simulated and the resulting KPIs were compared. The results of the sim-opt modeling 
delivered an optimal set of suppliers and order quantities to be purchased from them. The 
study though detailed and substantiated with real data, did not develop a risk mitigation 
strategy. There were no requirements for diversification or redundancy in the supplier 
portfolio. 
2.4 Procurement decisions in service industry supply chains 
Wang et al. (2015) conducted an extensive literature review of service supply 
chains in three main areas i.e. service demand management, service supply management, 
and coordination of service supply chains. They classified service supply chains as ‘service 
only supply chains’ (e.g. financial consulting) and ‘product service supply chains’ (e.g. 
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healthcare). In the review, the authors identified performance-based contract issues, and 
supply management with disruption risk as two important supply management issues.  
Healthcare service issues were identified as one of the important demand management 
issues in service supply chains. Interestingly, the authors found that similar to 
manufacturing, service supply chain buyers can orchestrate competition among the 
suppliers, prompting improved service quality through the supplier selection and market 
share allocation strategies (which allocates a proportion of demand to each supplier with 
respect to the quality of service promised). The authors concluded that in service supply 
chain management, industries such as IT and telecommunications, electricity, and finance 
have been popularly examined in the operations research (OR) literature. However, 
industries such as healthcare have not been well-explored in OR journals. This finding 
further highlights the importance of the research presented in this dissertation.  
Though information technology (IT) and healthcare were found to be the most 
common study settings for procurement research in the service industry, the effect of user 
preference for certain products has not been studied in detail in either of these settings.  The 
Ravindran et al (2010) discussion about procurement models in an IT industry resonates 
closely with the line of inquiry of this dissertation. The authors approached the multi-
attribute risk adjusted supplier selection problem using four variations of goal 
programming (GP) models i.e.  pre-emptive GP, non-pre-emptive GP, Tchebycheff GP and 
fuzzy GP. The supplier risk was defined as a function of two dimensions of risk, severity 
of impact and frequency of occurrence. Different levels of these two dimensions created 
either a disruption (named MtT, modeled as Taguchi’s loss function) or disaster (named 
VaR, modeled as a generalized extreme value distribution) type of risk in the supply chain. 
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Phase 1 of the study ranked a list of 20 suppliers by 14 attributes related to delivery, price 
etc. Phase 2 used four of the fourteen attributes; lead time, quality, cost and risk 
(represented by variables VaR and MtT) in the objective function of the optimization 
model. Results from phase 2 were used to compare the different goal programming models. 
Each model performed differently for each goal allowing the user to decide which model 
to implement depending on which goal was most important to them.  
Specific to hospital procurement related research, Jacobsen et al. (1999) used 
integer programming to illustrate the use of operations research methodologies for vaccine 
procurement and delivery. Using various objective functions such as cost minimization, 
cost maximization, and cost minimization with constraints on manufacturers selected, the 
study highlighted how the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention can create a set of 
operations research tools to guide vaccine procurement. The study highlighted the loss of 
cost competitiveness when supply redundancy has to build into the procurement process 
by allocating market share to all manufacturers.  
More recently, Karsak and Dursun (2015) used a healthcare setting to test a fuzzy 
logic supplier selection model. The procurement department of the hospital was found to 
use three supplier selection attributes; cost, quality, and delivery. Additional criteria of 
product volume, payment method, supply variety, reliability, experience, location, 
management and business relation were obtained from literature. Further it was found that 
there were five fundamental product characteristics relevant to the healthcare setting; cost, 
quality, product conformity, availability and customer support, and efficacy of corrective 
action (which may be related to product recalls but was not elaborated on by the authors). 
Weights for the criteria were assigned by interviewing procurement and clinical 
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employees. Also interdependencies among the selection criteria were obtained through the 
interviews. There were no quantity allocations calculated and the model was mainly used 
to rank suppliers.  Physician preference was not accounted for in this study - perhaps 
because the study was conducted in Turkey where healthcare procurement may function 
differently. 
Extending the typical definition of strategic sourcing to include corporate social 
responsibility, Knight et al (2017) modified a traditional spend analysis process framework 
to identify savings opportunities that allow a hospital to achieve strategic purchasing and 
social responsibility objectives. Traditional spend analysis entails collecting historical 
spend data, finding and prioritizing appropriate candidate item categories to renegotiate, 
and engaging vendors to achieve better contractual rates. To enhance the traditional 
approach, the authors employed regression analysis to examine the eﬀect of sustainability 
initiatives and acquisition planning decisions on purchasing, using “transactional savings” 
as the dependent variable. The regression's independent variables were selected based on 
the organization's strategic goals and operating environment. Examples of independent 
variables includes small business status, open market purchase, and contract value. This 
model allowed the organization to identify characteristics of potential strategic partners 
that supported the sustainability goals outlined by the organization. The case study 
however, did not extend to the identiﬁcation of strategic vendors or the eﬀectiveness of 
these partners to realize cost eﬃciencies or to meet the chosen sustainability goals. Thus, 
such a selection might result in the choice of a vendor who may not offer the most 
competitive pricing.  
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Kros et al. (2018) focused their attention on the role of buyer-supplier relationship 
and information management in healthcare inventory procurement and management, using 
transaction cost economics (TCE) and contingency theories, and survey methodology. The 
authors focused on a specific channel of inventory management, namely the use of 
healthcare inventory vending machines. As applied to the adoption of inventory vending 
machines, TCE was used to explain why certain activities are outsourced (in this case 
managing inventory) while contingency theory was used to explain why hospitals should 
focus on patient care type activities given that is their core competency. The authors 
recognized user behavior in healthcare where clinicians often bypass inventory 
management teams and directly contact vendors to fulfill their product needs. Managing 
inventory in such situations is obviously more difficult especially if there is no information 
management (regarding the inventory) between the hospital and the vendors. Survey 
responses from 130 healthcare professionals were used to collect data for hypotheses 
testing. From the hypotheses tested (hypotheses were related to the roles of information 
management and quality of buyer supplier relationship in vendor managed inventory in 
healthcare) in the research, the authors concluded that quality of relationship quality did 
not have a direct significant effect on the cost of healthcare vending machines or inventory 
management benefits. However, quality of relationship had a significant indirect positive 
effect the two variables through information management as the mediating variable. 
Finally, the authors concluded that the quality of buyer-supplier relationship may not 
always impact performance directly, which was a different conclusion than other literature 
pertaining to vendor managed inventory. 
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2.5 Summary 
Academic research regarding strategic sourcing has evolved as the practitioners 
have recognized supply chain sourcing as a core strength instead of just a buying function. 
As practitioners try to build resiliency in the supply chain by identifying the risks involved 
in sourcing, it is important that academicians provide tools and methodologies to help with 
these risk management decisions. Much has been written about the role of vendors, the 
process of contract negotiations, and the risks inherent to these decisions. The research here 
adds to the current body of knowledge related to strategic sourcing by using healthcare as 
a setting and recognizing its unique characteristics such as physician preference. It does so 
by recognizing physician preference as an obstacle to contract negotiation and procurement 
strategy design. The study discusses diversification strategies as seen in previous literature 
but goes one step further and uses a mathematical model to test trade-offs between 
diversification and total cost. Also, as recommended in academic publications, this 
research captures vendor characteristics via a scorecard. This further ensures that any 
vendor characteristics that may introduce disruptions in the supply chain are adequately 
captured and represented in the quantitative model. From a methodological view, although 
DEA has often been found to be the most common approach for supplier selection 
problems (Fahimnia et al., 2015), it is ill-suited as a methodology for creating a 
procurement model. Generally used in literature for finding an “efficient” group of 
suppliers, DEA is a linear programming based technique for measuring and comparing the 
relative performance of organizational units (such as suppliers) with multiple inputs and 
outputs. Applying DEA for the intended research in this dissertation would mean assuming 
all suppliers offer the exact same product (or combinations of products) and blending 
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procurement strategies in any proportion would have no effect on market share of suppliers 
thus allowing the same volume discounts to continue. Both these assumptions are incorrect 
and not in alignment with the goal of this research where it is intended to study the 
economic consequences of change in market share on price tiers. 
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3 Analytical model research framework 
Analytical models help examine how a chosen strategic objective is impacted by variation 
in modeling parameters. In this research the objective is minimization of the total purchase 
cost post rebate and penalties associated with minimum score violations. The parameters 
that affect the objective are minimum number of vendors required for supply diversity 
(defined by market share), minimum vendor scores required for each performance 
scorecard dimension, rate of product substitutability at a product and category level (which 
depends on the flexibility of physicians to accept alternative devices or accessories in the 
same category), and bulk buy parameters for quantity discounts. The analytical model 
research framework consists of a discussion of the supply chain structure under study, the 
problem description, and modeling approach. These are discussed in the next few sections. 
 
3.1 Supply Chain Structure 
A simplified healthcare supply chain structure is illustrated in Figure 2. This general 
representation of the main functions shows the flow of product requests and product 
through the various echelons (manufacturers/suppliers, central sourcing, central 
warehousing, and hospitals) as described next. The hospital system serving as the setting 
for this dissertation has this business structure as well and the important participants in the 
supply chain are:  
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Figure 2: Schematic of the healthcare supply chain 
1. Medical Device Manufacturers/Suppliers – Every product category can be offered 
by single or multiple vendors. Generally, vendors negotiate contracts through the 
central sourcing departments or GPOs. There of course, may be, non-compliant 
vendors that may reach out to individual hospitals/physicians to facilitate product 
usage. Vendors can send product to the central warehouse or directly to hospital 
warehouses depending on the type of products. 
2. Central Sourcing – The vendor facing department of the supply chain that handles 
functions related to supplier/vendor relationship management, vendor selection, 
vendor compliance, creating and maintaining vendor scorecards, vendor (supplier) 
development, contract negotiations, contract maintenance, and implementing 
strategic sourcing initiatives such as bulk buys.  
3. Central Warehouse – The central warehouse in the supply chain receives physician 
preference, high-value medical devices purchased in quantities stipulated by the 
HospitalsMedical Device 
Manufacturer/ Supplier
Central 
Sourcing
Central 
Warehouse
Product Request Flow
Product Flow
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sourcing contracts. The central warehouse delivers products to hospitals within 24 
hours.  
4. Hospitals – Hospitals have their own warehouses which receive product from the 
central warehouse. These are then distributed by the supply chain personnel to 
various stocking locations throughout the hospitals. The clinicians (nurses, doctors 
etc.) pull product from these stocking locations for planned and unplanned medical 
procedures thus generating demand. When these products are used in an operating 
room or the cardia catheterization lab the clinical system records their usage and 
captures the demand being generated. 
With this multi-echelon supply chain structure, there are two main elements of process 
flow to consider. Figure 2 shows product request flow and product flow. 
i. Product request flow  
a. For non-bulk buy products - The requesters at the hospital create purchase 
orders by department which are aggregated and sent to the purchasing 
department. These requests are then sent to the vendor or manufacturer. 
b. For bulk buy products - The requesters at the hospital send product requests 
directly to the central warehouse. The central sourcing department reviews 
product stock at the central warehouse, hospital warehouses, purchase 
history, and product usage. They then co-ordinate with the purchasing and 
distribution departments to create orders for the items that need to be 
replenished. The product orders are processed, sent to the vendor, and stock 
is delivered to the central and local warehouses. 
ii. Product flow 
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a. For non-bulk buy products – Products are sent directly from the vendor / 
manufacturer to the hospital warehouses.  
b. For bulk buy products - Products are sent to the central warehouse and then 
distributed to the hospital warehouses. 
3.2 Problem Description 
Implementing cost containment strategies, such as efficient product procurement, can be 
challenging when the ultimate users are unwilling to use alternate products. Complicating 
the procurement problem further, is the fact that not all product suppliers are comparable 
in terms of their product offerings and business performance. Choosing the appropriate 
supplier (either in terms of cost or scorecard performance) may conflict with the users’ 
preference for that supplier. In this dissertation, user preference is represented by the 
physicians’ preference to use certain products amongst all available supplier products. 
Thus, the problem presented here is designing a strategic procurement plan that 
accommodates the use of preferred products and limitations on what products may be used 
as substitutes for them (driven by overall constraints on percentage of instances where 
substitutions for preferred product can occur and paired vendor substitutions), bulk buy 
rates, minimum vendor score expectations, and desired vendor diversification. 
This procurement problem is addressed using an appropriate MILP optimization cost 
model that recommends procurement quantities of unique SKUs (identified by index p) in 
category c from a vendor v. The model allows restrictions on percentage of instances where 
a substitute item can be used for a preferred product (at a product and category level). 
Further restrictions can be imposed in a pairwise fashion that limit the proportion of 
particular substitutes that can be purchased as alternatives to the preferred product. For the 
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model, it is assumed that there is always a uniquely preferred product and it may be 
substituted by other products in the same category from the same or different vendor. It is 
also assumed that, category-level demand is determined as the sum of the demands for 
products as preferred items that compose the category.  Satisfying the demand at the 
category level allows the planned medical procedure to be successfully completed.  
3.3 Model construction  
To address the problem stated in the previous section, a mixed-integer mathematical 
programming model with options to adjust bulk buy rates, minimum vendor score 
expectations, desired vendor diversification and physician preference, is employed to 
determine optimal procurement quantities of product category to be purchased from a set 
of vendors. Details of the optimization model’s objective and constraints, the decision 
variables, parameters, and data used are presented in the next section. 
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4 Optimization Model 
Optimization models are often used in procurement for supplier selection, quantity 
allocation, buyer-supplier relationship negotiation, and quantity discount planning. The 
mixed integer linear programming model employed for this research allows us to design a 
purchasing plan with consideration of key decision parameters, namely, physician 
preference, vendor market share, supplier scorecards, and quantity discount tiers.  
In section 4 we discuss the design and testing of the optimization model beginning with an 
enumeration of the assumptions, formulation, and data. 
4.1 Model description 
First the assumptions employed to build the mixed-integer mathematical programming 
model are described. We follow this with the formulation of the optimization model 
including details about the model objective, sets of variables, parameters and constraints. 
4.1.1 Model assumptions 
i. We assume that there is no supplier inter-dependence and suppliers do not depend 
on each other to fulfill customer demand. Analysis of vendor supply-chain structure 
is outside the scope of this study. A pooled interdependence is assumed, which 
indicates that each vendor uses independent inputs and makes independent 
contributions to the organization, with no inputs from another vendor in selection 
pool (Chakraborty & Philip, 1996). Such interdependencies need only be 
considered for studies focusing on supplier development, which is also outside the 
scope of this study. 
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ii. We assume that supplier capacity is unlimited and they can fulfill demand for all 
purchase quantities allocated to them.  
iii. Consideration of disruption risks arising from stochastic demand are deferred for 
future research. We assume that category demands are deterministic and 
independent.  For example, lead wires are a category of accessories. These can be 
consumable accessories that may wear out sooner than the main product. Their 
demand can also be considered independent of pacemakers or defibrillators since 
they can sometimes be used as accessories for older models of the products. We 
acknowledge that while this assumption of independent demand may be true for the 
categories being used in this dissertation in other categories, the assumption may 
need to be revised. 
iv. We assume that if allowable substitutes are used, patient outcomes are the same. 
Though no formal outcomes analysis has been conducted, the observations and 
physician inputs over time have indicated that product categories being considered 
for negotiations usually have the same patient outcomes, even when a substitute 
product is used. If outcomes data are available at a future date, it would make an 
interesting extension to this research. 
v. We assume that every product is associated with a single product category. Similar 
to the vendor interdependencies, we assume that there are no interdependencies 
within products in different categories. Every unique product SKU can belong to 
one category only but a single category can consist of multiple unique 
SKUs/products 
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vi. We assume that there is always a uniquely preferred product and it may be 
substituted by other products in the same category from the same or different 
vendor. 
vii. We assume that category-level demand is determined as the sum of the demands 
for products as preferred items that compose the category. 
 
4.2 Optimization Model Formulation 
 
This section describes the sets, variables, and constraints used in the MILP model 
formulation. 
Sets: 
P: Set of individual product SKUs p under consideration 
C: Set of product categories c 
V: Set of vendors v 
CV(v): Set of product categories offered by vendor v 
VC(c): Set of vendors offering products in category c 
PCV(c, v): Set of products offered in category c by vendor v 
SC (c): Set of products in a category 
SP(p): Set of possible products that may serve as a substitute for product p 
PS(p): Set of possible products for which p can substitute 
P{p,s(p)} : Set of products p and potential substitutes s (possible combinations of p and s) 
 
Parameters  
𝑑𝑒𝑚𝑐𝑐: Expected demand for products in category c (in units over the planning horizon)  
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𝑑𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐𝑣𝑣 : Expected demand for product p as the preferred product in category c from 
vendor v (in units over the planning horizon) 
𝑏𝑒𝑓𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐𝑣𝑣: Unit price of product p from vendor v before quantity discount is applied 
𝑏𝑢𝑙𝑘𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑐𝑐𝑣𝑣: Total unit volume of purchases in category c required to qualify for bulk buy 
discount from vendor v 
M: Large number used to relax constraints 
𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐𝑣𝑣 : Price score of vendor v for product p within category c 
𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑐𝑜: Highest possible price score granted for items in category c 
𝑙𝑏𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒: Lower bound on index representing achievement of price goal for products used 
in category c, across all vendors 
𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐𝑣𝑣 : Quality score of vendor v for product p within category c 
𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑐𝑜: Highest possible quality score granted for items in category c 
𝑙𝑏𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙: Lower bound on index representing achievement of quality goal for products used 
in category c, across all vendors 
𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐𝑣𝑣 : Service score of vendor v for product p within category c 
𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑠𝑐𝑜: Highest possible service score granted for items in category c 
𝑙𝑏𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣: Lower bound on index representing achievement of service goal for products used 
in category c 
𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐𝑣𝑣: Innovation score of vendor v for product p within category c 
𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑠𝑐𝑜: Highest possible innovation score granted for items in category c 
𝑙𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑜: Lower bound on index representing achievement of innovation goal for products 
used in category c 
𝑑𝑒𝑙𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐𝑣𝑣 :  Delivery score of vendor v for product p within category c 
𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑑𝑒𝑙𝑠𝑐𝑜: Highest possible delivery score granted for items in category c  
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𝑙𝑏𝑑𝑒𝑙: Lower bound on index representing achievement of delivery goal for products used 
in category c 
𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑥𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐𝑣𝑣 : Operational excellence score of vendor v for product p within category c 
𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑥𝑠𝑐𝑜: Highest possible operational excellence score granted for items in category 
c 
𝑙𝑏𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑥: Lower bound on index representing achievement of operational excellence goal 
for products used in category c 
𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑝𝑐𝑐 : Penalty for each unit of deficiency in aggregate price points for products in 
category c   
𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑞𝑐𝑐 : Penalty for each unit of deficiency in aggregate quality points for products in 
category c   
𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑐𝑐 : Penalty for each unit of deficiency in aggregate service points for products in 
category c 
𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑜𝑝𝑐𝑐 : Penalty for each unit of deficiency in aggregate operational excellence points 
for products in category c 
𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑐𝑐 : Penalty for each unit of deficiency in aggregate delivery points for products in 
category c 
𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑖𝑐𝑐 : Penalty for each unit of deficiency in aggregate innovation points for products in 
category c 
maxmktshrc𝑐v𝑣 : Maximum percentage of demand in any product category that can be 
covered by a single vendor 
𝐩𝐜𝐭𝐫𝐞𝐛𝐚𝐭𝐞𝐜𝒄𝐯𝒗: Percentage reduction in price of items in a product category that occurs 
when qualifying threshold is met  
𝐦𝐚𝐱𝐩𝐜𝐭𝐬𝐮𝐛𝐩𝒑: Maximum portion of demand for product p that is substitutable 
𝐦𝐚𝐱𝐩𝐜𝐭𝐬𝐮𝐛𝐜𝒄: Maximum portion of demand in a product category that may be met by 
substitute products 
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𝐦𝐚𝐱𝐩𝐚𝐢𝐫𝐩𝒑𝐬𝒔: Maximum portion of demand for product p that may be satisfied by 
substitute product s  
𝐬𝐮𝐛𝐬𝐭𝐢𝐭𝐮𝐭𝐢𝐨𝐧 𝐢𝐧𝐟𝐥𝐚𝐭𝐢𝐨𝐧 𝐟𝐚𝐜𝐭𝐨𝐫 : A small inflation in price when products are used as 
substitutes instead of preferred products. 
 
 
Decision Variables and Derived Variables 
𝒕𝒒𝒑𝒑𝒄𝒄𝒗𝒗 : Total quantity of product p from category c from vendor v to be purchased as 
either the preferred product or substitute for other products 
𝒒𝒑𝒑𝒄𝒄𝒗𝒗: Quantity of product p from category c from vendor v to be purchased as the 
preferred product 
𝒔𝒖𝒃𝒑𝒑𝒔𝒔: Quantity of product p purchased as a substitute for product s 
𝒔𝒖𝒃𝒑𝒔𝒔𝒑: Quantity of product s purchased as a substitute for product p 
𝒒𝒕𝒅𝒊𝒔𝒄𝒄𝒗𝒗: Binary variable indicating whether purchases from vendor v in category c are 
sufficient to qualify for a quantity discount on purchases in that product category (only one 
discount tier in consideration) 
𝑟𝑒𝑏𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑐𝑐𝑣𝑣 : Magnitude of rebate earned for products in category c from vendor v 
𝑎𝑔𝑔𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑐𝑐 : Aggregate scorecard deficiency for price metric 
𝑎𝑔𝑔𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑐𝑐 : Aggregate scorecard deficiency for service metric 
𝑎𝑔𝑔𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑐𝑐 : Aggregate scorecard deficiency for quality metric 
𝑎𝑔𝑔𝑜𝑝𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑐𝑐 : Aggregate scorecard deficiency for operational excellence metric 
𝑎𝑔𝑔𝑑𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑐𝑐 : Aggregate scorecard deficiency for delivery metric 
𝑎𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑐𝑐 : Aggregate scorecard deficiency for innovation metric 
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Objective Function 
 
For a strategic sourcing model, various objectives can be considered. Relevant examples 
include minimizing total cost of ownership, minimizing total supply cost, minimizing 
variability in supplier performance (Talluri and Narasimhan, 2003), goal programming 
approaches to minimize deviation from expected performance goals (Talluri, 2008), 
minimizing cost of bids (Sandholm, 2007) and others. For the purpose of this study, the 
objective is chosen to be minimization of total purchasing cost (also referred to as supply 
spend) with penalties for failing to meet scorecard standards. Fixed costs such as 
administrative costs and supplier maintenance costs involved in contract negotiations are 
not considered in the objective function since these do not vary. The primary aim of the 
supply chain is to reduce the incurred purchasing cost of the products and hence that is the 
only cost considered in the optimization model. The MILP model can be structured to 
accommodate other business rules related to fixed and variable costs, penalties related to 
market share violations, limits on vendor supply quantities etc. The MILP model in its 
current format can accommodate data for a larger set of suppliers and products as well. We 
expect solution times to increase for larger data sets making this problem, in its generic 
form, a NP hard problem.  The mathematical formulation of the objective function and 
constraints follows. 
Minimize total spend shown in equation (1) defined as total cost of products purchased (as 
preferred and substitutes) net of bulk purchase the rebates earned, plus penalties for 
scorecard deficiencies. Potential penalties for scorecard violations were used to ensure that   
devices and supplies would be provided for all planned medical procedures (while 
minimizing aggregate penalties) and signal when constraints were violated.  Any solution 
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with a penalty for scorecard violations implies that conflicting constraints occurred in the 
respective scenario (i.e., hard constraints would result in “no feasible solution”). 
∑ (∑ ∑ (𝑞𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐𝑣𝑣 ∗ 𝑏𝑒𝑓𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐𝑣𝑣) +  ∑ ∑ (𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑝𝑝𝑠𝑠 ∗𝑆∈𝑆𝑃{𝑝}𝑝∈𝑆𝐶{𝑐}𝑝∈𝑃𝐶𝑉{𝑐,𝑣}𝑐∈𝐶𝑉{𝑣}𝑣∈𝑉
𝑏𝑒𝑓𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐𝑣𝑣 ∗ 𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟)  − (∑ 𝑟𝑒𝑏𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑐𝑐𝑣𝑣𝑐∈𝐶𝑉{𝑣} )) + 
∑ (𝑎𝑔𝑔𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑐𝑐  ∗  𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑝𝑐𝑐)𝑣∈𝑉  + ∑ (𝑎𝑔𝑔𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑐𝑐  ∗   𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑐𝑐)𝑣∈𝑉  + 
∑ (𝑎𝑔𝑔𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑐𝑐  ∗  𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑞𝑐𝑐)𝑣∈𝑉  + ∑ (𝑎𝑔𝑔𝑜𝑝𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑐𝑐  ∗  𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑜𝑝𝑐𝑐)𝑣∈𝑉  + 
∑ (𝑎𝑔𝑔𝑑𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑐𝑐   ∗  𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑐𝑐)𝑣∈𝑉  + ∑ (𝑎𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑐𝑐  ∗  𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑖𝑐𝑐 )𝑣∈𝑉                             (1) 
The rebate (in dollars) can only be achieved if the purchase quantity meets the stipulated 
bulk buy volume for quantity discounts and binary constraints on the quantity-discount 
indicators 
Constraint   𝑹𝑬𝑩𝑻𝑪𝒄𝑽𝒗 : Constraint to earn rebate 
The rebate (in dollars) can only be achieved if the purchase quantity meets the stipulated 
bulk buy volume for quantity discounts.  
𝑟𝑒𝑏𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑐𝑐𝑣𝑣 ≤ M*  𝑞𝑡𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑣𝑣          ∀c  ∀𝑣 where M is a large number                     (2) 
 
Constraint   𝑸𝑻𝑫𝑰𝑺𝑪𝒄𝑽𝒗 : Constraint for bulk volume needed 
Equation (3) sets a binary rebate qualifying variable to be less than or equal to the total 
purchased amount from the vendor (or vendor category) / minimum product volume 
required to qualify for rebate. Here bulk buy percentage refers to a percentage increase in 
business (i.e. historic usage) needed to qualify for price discount. 
𝑞𝑡𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑣𝑣≤  (∑ 𝑡𝑞𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐𝑣𝑣 𝑝∈𝑃𝐶𝑉{𝑐,𝑣}  )/𝑏𝑢𝑙𝑘𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑐𝑐𝑣𝑣 for each v, for each c𝟄 CV {v}       (3) 
 
Constraint  𝑨𝑴𝑻𝑹𝑩𝑻𝑪𝒄𝑽𝒗: Constraint for rebate magnitude 
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Magnitude of the rebate is calculated as a percentage of the total spend on the products 
purchased as preferred and substitutes in a category for each vendor.   The RHS of Equation 
(4) indicates the upper bound on the dollar magnitude of rebate. 
𝑟𝑒𝑏𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑐𝑐𝑣𝑣 ≤ (∑  𝑏𝑒𝑓𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐𝑣𝑣 ∗ 𝑝𝑐𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑏𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑐𝑐𝑣𝑣 ∗ 𝑝∈𝑃𝐶𝑉{𝑐,𝑣} 𝑡𝑞𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐𝑣𝑣)  for each v and  
each c𝟄 CV {v}                     (4) 
 
Equations (5) – (10) impose the scorecard requirements on the vendors. In general, all the 
scorecard constraints state weighted average score for each vendor must exceed a stipulated 
minimum score or incur an appropriate penalty. The aggregate scorecard deficiencies are 
multiplied by estimated penalties for each unit of deficiency in the objective function. The 
magnitude of the penalties are estimated to be large enough so that it is never advantageous 
to incur a penalty. The scorecard constraints are designed so that they may be imposed at 
the product level if required. The hypothetical scorecard generated for the experiments in 
this research are generated at the category level but this structure of constraints can easily 
accommodate product level scores. 
We state each constraint first as a weighted scorecard metric and then linearize it so it 
represents an aggregate metric.  
The first of the scorecard dimensions is the product price metric. This indicates the 
vendor’s cost competitiveness. 
Constraint 𝑷𝑹𝑰𝑪𝑬𝑪𝒄𝑽𝒗: Weighted price metric constraint 
∑ (𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐𝑣𝑣 ∗ 𝑡𝑞𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐𝑣𝑣)𝑝∈𝑃𝐶𝑉{𝑐,𝑣} / ∑ (𝑡𝑞𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐𝑣𝑣)𝑝∈𝑃𝐶𝑉{𝑐,𝑣}  ≥ 
(𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑐𝑜 * 𝑙𝑏𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒) for each c, v                                                                                 (5) 
Constraint  𝑷𝑹𝑰𝑪𝑬𝑪𝒄𝑽𝒗 (Linearized): Aggregate price metric constraint 
∑ (𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐𝑣𝑣 ∗ 𝑡𝑞𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐𝑣𝑣)𝑝∈𝑃𝐶𝑉{𝑐,𝑣} − (( 𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑐𝑜 ∗  𝑙𝑏𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒) ∗
 ∑ (𝑡𝑞𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐𝑣𝑣)))𝑝∈𝑃𝐶𝑉{𝑐,𝑣} +𝑎𝑔𝑔𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑐𝑐  ≥ 0   for each c, v                            
(5L) 
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The second scorecard dimension is quality. This metric measures the supplier’s 
performance on offering high quality medical devices. 
Constraint 𝑸𝑼𝑨𝑳𝑪𝒄𝑽𝒗: Weighted quality metric constraint 
∑ (𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐𝑣𝑣 ∗ 𝑡𝑞𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐𝑣𝑣)𝑝∈𝑃𝐶𝑉{𝑐,𝑣} / ∑ (𝑡𝑞𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐𝑣𝑣)𝑝∈𝑃𝐶𝑉{𝑐,𝑣}  ≥ 
(𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑐𝑜*𝑙𝑏𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙) for each c, v                                                                          (6) 
Constraint  𝑸𝑼𝑨𝑳𝑪𝒄𝑽𝒗 (Linearized): Aggregate quality metric constraint 
∑ (𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐𝑣𝑣 ∗ 𝑡𝑞𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐𝑣𝑣)𝑝∈𝑃𝐶𝑉{𝑐,𝑣} − ((𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑐𝑜 ∗  𝑙𝑏𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙) ∗
 ∑ (𝑡𝑞𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐𝑣𝑣)))𝑝∈𝑃𝐶𝑉{𝑐,𝑣} +𝑎𝑔𝑔𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑐𝑐  ≥ 0   for each v                           (6L) 
 
The third scorecard constraint is the service metric constraint, which ensures that suppliers 
who have a history of providing good service are chosen. 
Constraint 𝑺𝑬𝑹𝑽𝑪𝒄𝑽𝒗: Weighted Service metric constraint 
∑ (𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐𝑣𝑣 ∗ 𝑡𝑞𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐𝑣𝑣)𝑝∈𝑃𝐶𝑉{𝑐,𝑣} / ∑ ∑ (𝑡𝑞𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐𝑣𝑣)𝑝∈𝑃𝐶𝑉{𝑐,𝑣}𝑐∈𝐶𝑉{𝑐}  ≥ 
(𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑠𝑐𝑜 *𝑙𝑏𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣) for each v (7) 
Constraint 𝑺𝑬𝑹𝑽𝑪𝒄𝑽𝒗 (Linearized): Aggregate Service metric constraint 
∑ (𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐𝑣𝑣 ∗ 𝑡𝑞𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐𝑣𝑣)𝑝∈𝑃𝐶𝑉{𝑐,𝑣} − ((𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑠𝑐𝑜 ∗  𝑙𝑏𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣) ∗
∑ (𝑡𝑞𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐𝑣𝑣)))𝑝∈𝑃𝐶𝑉{𝑐,𝑣}   + 𝑎𝑔𝑔𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑐𝑐 ≥ 0     for each v                     (7L) 
 
The rate of technological advancement in the medical device industry is understandably 
fast. A hospital’s suppliers are an essential partner in ensuring that products used are 
modern and in keeping with current technological trends. A competent supplier should 
have a good understanding of medical technology and should share information product 
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development information with the providers. The innovation score indicates a supplier’s 
willingness to share their product development pipeline with the healthcare organization. 
The innovation metric constraint outlines the requirements placed on a suppliers in regards 
to this constraint 
Constraint 𝑰𝑵𝑵𝑶𝑽𝑪𝒄𝑽𝒗: Weighted Innovation metric constraint 
∑ ( 𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐𝑣𝑣  ∗  𝑡𝑞𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐𝑣𝑣)𝑝∈𝑃𝐶𝑉{𝑐,𝑣} /( ∑ (𝑡𝑞𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐𝑣𝑣))𝑝∈𝑃𝐶𝑉{𝑐,𝑣}  ≥ 
 (𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑠𝑐𝑜  *𝑙𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑜) for each v              (8) 
Constraint 𝑰𝑵𝑵𝑶𝑽𝑪𝒄𝑽𝒗 (Linearized):  Aggregate Innovation metric constraint 
∑ ( 𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐𝑣𝑣  ∗  𝑡𝑞𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐𝑣𝑣)𝑝∈𝑃𝐶𝑉{𝑐,𝑣} − ((𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑠𝑐𝑜 *𝑙𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑜)  ∗
  ∑ (𝑡𝑞𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐𝑣𝑣)))𝑝∈𝑃𝐶𝑉{𝑐,𝑣}  + 𝑎𝑔𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑐𝑐  ≥ 0 for each v                              (8L)  
If a supplier cannot deliver product on time (either through a distributor or self-
distribution), then the organizations runs the risk of stocking out of product. In worse case 
situations this may cause cancellations of medical procedures. From a supply chain risk 
management perspective, the delivery metric truly captures the suppliers most likely to 
cause disruptions in the supply chain. Given the importance of on time deliveries and fill 
rates, equation (9) captures the bounds imposed on the required score for the supplier’s 
delivery metric. 
Constraint 𝑫𝑬𝑳𝑪𝒄𝑽𝒗: Weighted Delivery metric constraint 
∑ ( 𝑑𝑒𝑙𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐𝑣𝑣  ∗  𝑡𝑞𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐𝑣𝑣)𝑝∈𝑃𝐶𝑉{𝑐,𝑣} /( ∑ (𝑡𝑞𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐𝑣𝑣))𝑝∈𝑃𝐶𝑉{𝑐,𝑣}  ≥ 
 (𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑑𝑒𝑙𝑠𝑐𝑜  * 𝑙𝑏𝑑𝑒𝑙) for each v                    (9) 
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Constraint 𝑫𝑬𝑳𝑪𝒄𝑽𝒗 (Linearized): Aggregate Delivery metric constraint 
∑ ( 𝑑𝑒𝑙𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐𝑣𝑣  ∗  𝑡𝑞𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐𝑣𝑣) − ((𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑑𝑒𝑙𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑐𝑐   ∗  𝑙𝑏𝑑𝑒𝑙𝑐𝑐) ∗𝑝∈𝑃𝐶𝑉{𝑐,𝑣}
 ( ∑ (𝑡𝑞𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐𝑣𝑣)))𝑝∈𝑃𝐶𝑉{𝑐,𝑣}  + 𝑎𝑔𝑔𝑑𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑐𝑐  ≥ 0   for each v             (9L) 
 
Operational excellence is an additional element of service which indicates the overall 
willingness of suppliers to co-operate in efforts to control costs through continuous 
improvement. It also indicates the supplier’s willingness to supplier to take responsibility 
for the design, manufacture, and warranty of their products. Equation (10) outlines the 
requirements for the minimum score needed to qualify a supplier on this attribute.      
Constraint 𝑶𝑷𝑬𝑿𝑪𝒄𝑽𝒗: Weighted Operational Excellence metric constraint 
∑ ( 𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑥𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐𝑣𝑣   ∗  𝑡𝑞𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐𝑣𝑣)𝑝∈𝑃𝐶𝑉{𝑐,𝑣} /( ∑ (𝑡𝑞𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐𝑣𝑣))𝑝∈𝑃𝐶𝑉{𝑐,𝑣}  ≥ 
 (𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑥𝑠𝑐𝑜   *𝑙𝑏𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑥) for each v                     (10) 
Constraint 𝑶𝑷𝑬𝑿𝑪𝒄𝑽𝒗 (Linearized): Aggregate Operational Excellence metric 
constraint 
∑ ( 𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑥𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐𝑣𝑣   ∗  𝑡𝑞𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐𝑣𝑣)𝑝∈𝑃𝐶𝑉{𝑐,𝑣} − (𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑥𝑠𝑐𝑜  *𝑙𝑏𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑥)* 
( ∑ (𝑡𝑞𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐𝑣𝑣))𝑝∈𝑃𝐶𝑉{𝑐,𝑣}  + 𝑎𝑔𝑔𝑜𝑝𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑐𝑐 ≥ 0  for each v        (10L) 
 
 
Constraint 𝑩𝑨𝑳𝑷𝒄𝑪𝒄𝑽𝒗 : Balance constraint for total quantities purchased as 
preferred or substitute products 
Total product purchased is equal to the sum of product purchased as a preferred product 
and product purchased to substitute for other products. 
𝑡𝑞𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐𝑣𝑣 = 𝑞𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐𝑣𝑣 + ∑ 𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑝𝑝𝑠𝑠𝑠∈{𝑃𝑆(𝑝)}  for each p (and associated c & v)    
(11) 
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Constraint 𝑺𝑼𝑩𝑪𝑨𝑻𝑪𝒄: Limit on total product substitution to meet category demand 
(sp) 
Quantity of product purchased as a substitute for product p is less than or equal to the 
maximum allowable percentage of substitutions needed to satisfy category level demand.   
∑ ∑ 𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑝𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑠∈𝑆𝑃(𝑝)𝑝∈𝑠𝑐(𝑐)   ≤ maxpctsubc𝑐 *  𝑑𝑒𝑚𝑐𝑐for each c                                    (12) 
 
Constraint   𝑳𝑰𝑴𝑺𝑼𝑩𝑷𝒑𝑺𝒔 : Limit for total substitutes for product p (sp) 
The constraint in Eq (13) limits the total number of substitutes, in aggregate for each 
product p. Thus the sum of quantity of product purchased as a substitute for product p 
(left hand of the equation) is less than or equal to the allowed percentage of substitutions 
to satisfy demand of product p purchased  
∑ 𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑝𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑠∈𝑆𝑃(𝑝)   ≤ maxpctsubp𝑝 * 𝑑𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐𝑣𝑣for each p        SP(p)                  (13) 
 
Constraint 𝑺𝑼𝑩𝑷𝑨𝑰𝑹𝑷𝒑𝑺𝒔: Limit on pairwise substitutes (sp) 
The constraint in Eq 14 limits the number of substitutes for each specific product-substitute 
pair. We derive these pairwise substitutions from a hypothetical vendor substitutability 
matrix discussed later. This means that products from vendor A may be substituted for 
products from vendor B but not vice versa. Products can be substituted as long as the 
original product and the substitute product belong to the same product category and an 
appropriate vendor. The pairwise substitution restrictions are implemented using the 
maxpairp𝑝s𝑠 parameter for maximum allowable pairwise substitutions. Section 4.3.4 
describes how the data for paired vendor substitution were generated. These substitutions 
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can easily be imposed as a more granular level and different substitution matrices may be 
experimented with. 
𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑝𝑠𝑠𝑝 ≤ maxpairp𝑝s𝑠* 𝑑𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐𝑣𝑣 for each p & s𝟄 SP(p)                           (14) 
 
In the Introduction chapter, we referred to PPI (Physician Preference Items) products. One 
of the primary parameters affecting the objective of cost reduction is the willingness of the 
physicians to use a less costly product but equally effective product from an alternative 
vendor. The example in Table 2 illustrates alternative products for a particular type of 
pacemaker. 
Table 2 : Example of substitutable products 
SKU Description Category Vendor 
1 EVIA HF-T53 mm Ã— 49 mm Ã— 6.5 mm/27 g,RF-
Implnt-N,Mntrng-Land,Uni/Bi,6.4 yrs 
CRT-P 1 
70 CONSULTA 15 cc/ 26 gm,RF-Implnt-N,Mntrng-
Wire/Cell,Bi,7.7 yrs 
CRT-P 1 
85 Viva CRT-P Device CRT-P 3 
 
In this example, SKU 1 can be substituted by SKU 70 and SKU 85. Similarly, SKU 1 can 
be used as a substitute for SKU 70 and SKU 85. As seen from the example, all substitutes 
must be in the same category but can be from the same or different vendor.  
Equation (15) represents the physicians’ preference for by using a substitutability 
parameter maxpctsubp𝑝 and historical product usage indicating the proportion of 
acceptable substitutable products in a category. The constraint models physician preference 
in product demand.  
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Constraint  𝑵𝑶𝑺𝑼𝑩𝑷𝒄𝑪𝒄𝑽𝒗 : Non Substitutable Demand Constraint  
The quantity purchased of each product as the preferred must be sufficient to satisfy the 
non-substitutable demand 
𝑞𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐𝑣𝑣 >=  𝑑𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐𝑣𝑣 * (1-maxpctsubp𝑝/100) for each p (and associated c & v)              
(15)               
 
Constraint   𝑫𝑬𝑴𝑪𝒄: Category Demand Constraint              
Successful procurement processes are those that ensure the demand is fully satisfied at the 
lowest possible cost, without comprising quality. The supply – demand constraint in 
equation (16) ensures that total products purchased from all vendors will be greater than or 
equal to the demand for a category.   
The demand for each category must be covered by purchases of either preferred or 
substitute products. 
∑ (∑ (𝑡𝑞𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐𝑣𝑣)𝑝∈𝑃𝐶𝑉 {𝑐,𝑣}𝑣∈𝑉𝐶{𝑣}    ≥  𝑑𝑒𝑚𝑐𝑐        for each c       (16) 
Constraint  𝑩𝑨𝑳𝑷𝒄𝑪𝒄𝑽𝒗 : Product Balance Constraint 
Total demand for an individual product must be covered by preferred or allowable product 
substitutes.  
∑ 𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑝𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑠∈{𝑆𝑃(𝑝)}    + 𝑞𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐𝑣𝑣 = 𝑑𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐𝑣𝑣  for each p     (17) 
Constraint   𝑴𝑺𝑪𝒄𝑽𝒗: Market Share Constraint 
The market share constraint in equation (18) restrains a vendor’s market share (in dollars) 
for a product category. This constraint ensures that a single vendor does not get all the 
purchase quantity allocated to them every quarter thereby producing vendor 
diversification.  
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Equation (18) states that the total value of products before discount for each vendor cannot 
exceed the maximum allowed dollar market share of expenditures in each category 
 
∑ (𝑡𝑞𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐𝑣𝑣 ∗  𝑏𝑒𝑓𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐𝑣𝑣)𝑝∈𝑃𝐶𝑉{𝑐,𝑣}  ≤   maxmktshrc𝑐v𝑣 * 
∑ ∑ (𝑡𝑞𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐𝑣𝑣 ∗  𝑏𝑒𝑓𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑝𝑝𝑐𝑐𝑣𝑣)𝑝∈𝑃𝐶𝑉{𝑐,𝑣}𝑣∈𝑉  for each v and c   (18) 
 
Lastly, all variables are nonnegative and technically integer (except for bulk commodities) 
but most purchase quantities are likely to be of sufficient magnitude to allow rounding to 
integer values as a reasonable approximation.  Thus, the only integer variables in the model, 
as solved, are the indicators of whether quantity discount thresholds are met for each 
vendor in each product category. 
The optimization model as formulated, in its generic state, is NP-hard. The purchase 
quantities were sufficiently large where rounding did not have a material impact on the 
magnitude.. Also the size of the current data set is modest enough to not present issues with 
the solution times. The model solves in less than one minute. It is possible that the solution 
times may increase if that vendor and product data sets are larger. 
4.3 Data 
The data for the optimization model consist of products SKUs, their price, and demand.  
These data are discussed in the following sections. Products are identified by unique SKUs 
which are associated with a particular product category and vendor.  
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4.3.1 Product data 
Supporting data for high value medical devices and supplies were collected from eight 
facilities in a large healthcare system with academic and community hospitals. An 
Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) system provided 12 months of historic usage 
information. The hospital system has a central supply-chain department that negotiates 
contracts for medical devices and supplies through the Central Sourcing team. To 
concentrate on costly PPIs, we choose products in the Cardiac Rhythm Management 
(CRM) area as shown in Table 3. These were all the vendors and product categories in the 
CRM area when this data was collected. These products include expensive items such as 
cardiac pacemakers, defibrillators, and lead wires – all of which have a high degree of 
physician preference. There are nine product categories, four vendors, and 217 unique 
products. A single category can have multiple unique SKUs. A SKU is unique to a category 
and cannot be shared across categories. Table 3 shows the summary of product offerings 
in the nine categories from the four vendors. Vendor 3 historically provided the largest 
number of SKUs. The Cardiac pacing leads or electrodes (PM) product category is the 
largest category with 46 unique products in it. 
 
Table 3: Summary of unique SKUs (by category and vendor) 
Category 
Number 
(cnum) 
Product Category 
Vendor 
1 
Vendor 
2 
Vendor 
3  
Vendor 
4 
Total 
1 
Cardiac 
resynchronization 
therapy pacemaker 
2 4 3 2 11 
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Category 
Number 
(cnum) 
Product Category 
Vendor 
1 
Vendor 
2 
Vendor 
3  
Vendor 
4 
Total 
2 
Cardiac pacing leads 
or electrodes (PM) 
5 7 21 13 46 
3 
Cardiac pacing leads 
or electrodes (LV) 
4 7 11 5 27 
4 
Cardiac pacing leads 
or electrodes (HV) 
7 8 10 10 35 
5 
Cardiac 
resynchronization 
therapy defibrillator 
5 9 5 4 23 
6 
Implantable 
Cardioverter 
Defibrillator Dual 
Chamber 
5 7 4 5 21 
7 
Implantable 
Cardioverter 
Defibrillator Single 
Chamber 
5 7 3 7 22 
8 Pacemaker-Dual 4 4 7 4 19 
9 Pacemaker-Single 4 3 4 2 13 
  Total 41 56 68 52 217 
 
 
4.3.2 Product pricing  
The actual product costs and total supply spend have been masked to protect the hospital’s 
financial data. Instead, the “cost index” indicates the relative product price offered by a 
vendor in comparison to average price of the product category. The non-weighted cost 
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index is created by taking the average price of a vendor’s products in a category and 
comparing it to average price of all products in that category. Thus, a higher cost index for 
a vendor indicates a relatively more expensive product. Table 4 shows the product cost 
indices by vendor and category. Though vendor 1 is cheaper overall there are categories 
for which they are not the cheapest. Similarly, though vendor 4 is the most expensive 
vendor overall there are categories for which other vendors are more expensive (See 
Category 2 cost index, for example).  From an annual spend perspective, for the data 
collected, categories 1 and 3 account for 4% of the total spend each, category 2 accounts 
for 3% of the total spend, category 4 accounts for 8% of the total spend, category 5 accounts 
for 34% of the total spend, category 6  accounts for 16% of the total spend, category 7  
accounts for 13% of the total spend, category 8 accounts for 16% of the total spend, and 
category 9 accounts for 2% of the total spend.  
 
Table 4: Historical product cost indices 
 Vendors 
Categories 1 2 3 4 
1 0.874 0.993 1.026 1.107 
2 1.003 0.943 1.058 0.995 
3 0.652 0.903 1.174 1.271 
4 0.91 1.036 1.018 1.036 
5 0.846 0.982 1.091 1.082 
6 0.907 0.963 1.065 1.065 
7 0.892 1.031 1.016 1.061 
8 1.078 0.911 1.037 0.974 
9 0.979 0.919 1.013 1.089 
Overall cost index 0.891 0.982 1.054 1.073 
- 
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4.3.3 Demand data 
 
There are two types of demand to be considered in the formulation of the optimization 
model as discussed below. In either case we estimate that future product demand is 
assumed to be an extension of historic product usage 
a. Category level demand (“cv” demand) 
Category demands are determined as the sum of the demands for products as preferred 
items in a category.  Product usage in the last year was used to determine demands for 
individual products, which, accumulated by category, also determined demand at the 
category level. Figure 3 shows the weekly historic product usage over a 12-month period 
for each of the nine product categories. The historic usage data used for this research were 
collected from various clinical information systems and enterprise resource planning 
systems. As is seen from Figure 3, the weekly product demand is small in magnitude, 
sporadic (or intermittent), and stationary. This is typical of expensive Cardiac Rhythm 
Management. Their usage would not be expected to be as frequent as something like 
syringes or bandages which are commodity products. 
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Figure 3: Variation in product demand (in units) across categories over time 
(weekly aggregate) 
 
Table 5 shows the annual category level demands for the products, by vendor.  
Table 5: Annual category level product demand 
Category 
number 
Category 
Vendor 
1 
Vendor 
2 
Vendor 
3 
Vendor 
4 
Total 
Category 
Demand 
1 
Cardiac 
resynchronization 
15 23 27 67 132 
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Category 
number 
Category 
Vendor 
1 
Vendor 
2 
Vendor 
3 
Vendor 
4 
Total 
Category 
Demand 
therapy 
pacemaker 
2 
Cardiac pacing 
leads or 
electrodes (PM) 
112 444 896 363 1,815 
3 
Cardiac pacing 
leads or 
electrodes (LV) 
20 48 172 159 399 
4 
Cardiac pacing 
leads or 
electrodes (HV) 
43 166 208 128 545 
5 
Cardiac 
resynchronization 
therapy 
defibrillator 
25 70 244 97 436 
6 
Implantable 
Cardioverter 
Defibrillator 
Dual Chamber 
29 82 137 39 287 
7 
Implantable 
Cardioverter 
Defibrillator 
Single Chamber 
15 99 80 28 222 
8 Pacemaker-Dual 132 210 526 64 932 
9 
Pacemaker-
Single 
50 30 61 16 157 
  Grand Total 441 1,172 2,351 961 4,925 
 
 
Table 6 shows the historical dollar market shares for the vendors for the various 
categories. 
Table 6: Historical percentage dollar market shares 
 Vendors 
Categories 1 2 3 4 
1 10% 17% 20% 54% 
2 5% 23% 51% 21% 
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 Vendors 
3 3% 9% 43% 46% 
4 7% 31% 38% 24% 
5 5% 15% 58% 23% 
6 9% 27% 50% 14% 
7 5% 49% 34% 12% 
8 15% 19% 60% 6% 
9 29% 18% 41% 12% 
Overall % market share 8% 23% 50% 19% 
 
 
b. Product level demand (“pcv” demand) 
For non-substitutability constraints at the product level (eq 14) product-level demand data 
are needed. This demand is estimated from past historic usage. Table 7 shows a sample of 
annual product level demand by vendor for category 1 products.  
Table 7: Sample product level annual demand in units (For Category: Cardiac 
resynchronization therapy pacemaker) 
Vendor SKU Annual unit usage 
1 1 10 
1 145 5 
2 63 8 
2 64 3 
2 103 8 
2 165 4 
3 70 5 
3 85 11 
3 158 11 
4 106 64 
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Vendor SKU Annual unit usage 
4 115 3 
  132 
 
4.3.4 Vendor substitutability data 
 
One of the constraints in our model refers to the extent to which different vendor products 
can be substituted for each other in each category of products. This type of vendor 
substitutability restriction was highlighted as a major procurement concern by the 
executives of the healthcare system used in this study. Generating vendor product 
substitutability data is an essential step to study the effect of the substitutability parameters 
on the optimization model output. This will determine in what proportion certain products 
from a vendor can be substituted by products from another vendor (in the same category).  
An example of paired vendor substitutions is shown in Figure 4 below. The vendors in the 
columns can serve as a substitutes for vendor in a row if the cell contains “1”. Such “one 
way” or paired vendor substitution restrictions may be due to proprietary product 
requirements, regulatory restrictions etc. The two dimensional array showing vendor to 
vendor substitutability can be broken down to generate tables showing one-way vendor 
substitutions. The difference between the tables in Figure 4, is most effectively illustrated 
by using vendor 2 as an example - products from vendor 2 can be substituted by products 
from vendor 3 but vendor 2 cannot offer products to substitute for other vendor products. 
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Figure 4: Vendor paired substitutability 
(Vendor in column may substitute for vendor in row) 
 
 
The substitution logic is illustrated using two examples below. 
Example 1 (Figure 5): Product number 1 (from category 1 offered by vendor 1) 
To determine which products can serve as substitutes for product 1, we refer to the table 
on the lower left in Figure 4. Per Figure 4, substitute products for product 1 can be found 
in category 1 offered by vendor 3 and vendor 4. Using this mapping, we find there are 5 
products that can serve as substitutes for product 1 as shown below in Figure 5. 
 We now refer to the table on the lower right in Figure 4. Per the table, product 1 can be 
used as a substitute for products in category 1 offered by vendor 3. Using this mapping, we 
find there are 3 products that can be substituted by product 1. The illustration below shows 
both these substitutions. 
 
 
 
 
V1 V2 V3 V4 
V1 1 0 1 1 
V2 0 1 1 0 
V3 1 0 1 0 
V4 0 0 1 1 
 
Vendor table for products that serve 
Original 
Vendor 
Substitute 
Vendor 
1 3 
1 4 
2 3 
3 1 
4 3 
as substitutes  
Vendor table  for products that  
each product may substitute 
Original 
Vendor 
Substitute 
Vendor 
 
1 3 
3 1 
3 2 
3 4 
4 1 
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Figure 5 : Illustration of paired vendor substitutability (Example 1) 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Example 2 (Figure 6): Product number 10 (Category 2, Vendor 2) 
To determine which products can serve as substitutes for product 10, we refer again to 
Figure 4. We see that the substitute products for product 10 can be found in category 2 
offered by vendor 3. Using this mapping, we find there are 21 products that can serve as 
substitutes for product 10. 
To determine which products can be substituted by product 10, we refer to Figure 4. Per 
Figure 4, products from vendor 2 cannot be used as a substitutes for any other vendor 
products. Thus there are 0 products that can be substituted by product 10. The illustration 
in Figure 6 below shows both these substitutions.  
Products that can 
serve as a substitute 
for product 1 
70 
85 
106 
115 
158 
Products that can 
be substituted by 
product 1 
70 
85 
158 
Preferred 
product 
1 
Parimal Kulkarni 
University of Missouri, St. Louis 
 
72 
 
Figure 6 : Illustration of paired vendor substitutability (Example 1) 
 
 
 
 
To demonstrate the different structures of restrictive paired vendor substitutability, 
three hypothetical cases are shown in Table 8 below. Case A shows a substitutability 
structure where all vendors can offer substitute products for all other vendors. Case B 
shows a somewhat more restricted substitutability scenario. Case C shows an even more 
restrictive substitutability scenario. The structure shown in Case B is adopted for model 
testing since it allows most substitutions yet is somewhat restrictive. This substitutability 
matrix is applied for products in all categories. It is possible to create such matrices for 
individual products. The ultimate goal of using this substitution matrix is to illustrate the 
effect of the degree of substitutability on the savings that can be achieved.  
 
 
 
Products that can serve as 
a substitute for product 
10 
16, 22 , 23, 33, 41, 48, 
49, 86, 87, 128, 130, 156, 
159 , 160, 163, 189, 201, 
202, 203, 204, 215 
Products that can be 
substituted by 
product 10 
NA 
Preferred 
product 
10 
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Table 8: Three hypothetical cases for paired vendor substitutability 
Case A  Case B  Case C 
 V1 V2 V3 V4   V1 V2 V3 V4   V1 V2 V3 V4 
V1 1 1 1 1  V1 1 0 1 0  V1 1 0 1 1 
V2 1 1 1 1  V2 0 1 1 1  V2 0 1 1 0 
V3 1 1 1 1  V3 1 1 1 1  V3 1 0 1 0 
V4 1 1 1 1  V4 1 1 0 1  V4 0 0 1 1 
 
Figure 7 shows, for Cases A, B, and C, distributions of the numbers of products for which 
a product may serve as a substitute, and the numbers of products that can substitute a given 
product.   For example, for Case B, there are 77 SKUs which can serve as substitutes for 
no more than 10 products.  There are 76 SKUs for which there are no more than 10 
substitutes. 
It can also be seen that dispersion of the sets varies depending on how tight the pairwise 
substitution matrix is set. In Case A (the fully substitutable matrix), there are 81 products 
which can substitute for 30 or more products. In Case B, this same set is limited to 7 
products. Also, in Case C there are more products that can substitute for up to 10 products 
indicating that as the substitutability gets more restricted, fewer products can be used as 
substitutes and be substituted. 
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Figure 7 : Frequency distribution of sizes of substitution sets PS(p) and SP(p) for 
Case A, B, & C 
Case A 
  
Case B 
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Case C 
 
 
 
 
The model output for all three cases is discussed in section 4.5.3 with all the relevant 
model output discussions. 
 
4.3.5 Vendor scorecard data 
 
The healthcare organization used as a setting in this study had undertaken an 
initiative for incorporating vendor scorecards into the procurement process. Balanced 
scorecards were being designed to assess vendor performance on several key financial and 
operational characteristics. Once formally implemented, scorecard ratings will be assigned 
by management personnel from various supply chain functions (Sourcing, Distribution & 
Logistics etc).   
In optimization models, vendor scorecard information may be incorporated in 
constraints which qualify vendors for supplying particular products, in the objective 
165
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function as a goal to be achieved, or in both.  In our preliminary discussions with supply-
chain leadership, it was readily apparent that mixing costs and scorecard measures in a 
consolidated objective function was impracticable and reaching consensus on a 
hierarchical set of goals would be challenging.  We therefore chose to incorporate 
scorecard ratings in constraints which qualify vendors to supply products in a chosen 
category. Additionally, this structure of the optimization model has the advantage of 
allowing supply chain managers the flexibility to stipulate the minimum weighted average 
score that a vendor must achieve on each performance dimension in each product category.  
The weights can be dynamically adjusted for a new contract consisting of a new set of 
products, vendors, and scorecard dimensions. 
Scorecard ratings can be assigned by a few key individuals or a large group of 
personnel that regularly interact with vendors. In our case, scorecard ratings will be 
assigned by only a few key individuals. With this scenario in mind and to determine if there 
were peculiarities in the rating process, six supply chain managers were presented with 
balanced scorecards to rate four vendors for products in the Cardiac Rhythm Management 
category. Scorecard dimensions under consideration were price, quality, innovation, 
operational excellence, service, and delivery. Product price was known to the respondents 
thus making the price score an objective metric. Other metrics were scored in a subjective 
manner, depending on the rater’s perception of the vendor’s capabilities in key areas such 
as technological advances, customer relationship management, operational efficiencies etc.  
Figure 8 shows the consolidated scores from the 6 responses. The average scores 
are on the higher end of the 1 – 5 scale indicating a potential rater bias to assign higher 
scores.  
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Figure 8 : 6 rater scorecard responses 
 
We observed two key rater behaviors during the exercise. First, we observed rater 
tendency to assign similar ratings to a vendor on all six dimensions for the different product 
category groups. Second, we asked the raters to describe their rating process and observed 
that the raters appeared to first select and score a particular dimension of interest to them 
(not necessarily the one listed first in the scorecard instrument), and then score the rest of 
the dimensions (perhaps in consonance with the dominant dimension). From these 
observations and the consolidated scorecard shown in Figure 8, it was apparent that there 
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were various types of rater biases in play during the scoring process. To appropriately 
include vendor scorecard considerations in our optimization model, it was necessary to 
study these biases and the various structures of vendor scorecards that they may produce. 
Given that the small sample of raters and time sensitivity of the scoring process would 
prevent us from implementing techniques used for mitigating these effects in mass surveys 
(such as changing the order in which dimensions of performance are considered, repeating 
the scoring exercise over various time periods etc.), our analysis was directed at first 
simulating the biases and then testing the potential effects of these two rater biases on future 
procurement plans. 
The first bias addressed in our research is called common-methods bias or common-
method variance and is attributable to “carry-over” or “halo” effects from one dimension 
to another (Peterson and Wilson, 1992). Common-method bias occurs when systematic 
variations in responses are caused by the measurement process or instrument used. 
Common method bias can manifest itself in the rater’s tendency to root their perception of 
vendor’s overall performance on one primary dimension or any previous dimensions. The 
effect of this bias is that it can induce correlations in the ratings given to vendor 
performance on the different dimensions.  In our case, a respondent may tend to provide 
ratings on one dimension similar to ratings on other dimensions in order to preserve 
consistency with an overall assessment of the vendor’s performance. The second type of 
bias is related to a rater’s tendency to be excessively optimistic or pessimistic regarding 
supplier performance and provide all high or all low scores on a scorecard.  The effect of 
this bias is to shift scores upward or downward but without affecting the correlations 
among the scores (Kauffman et al., 2010). To maintain cordiality, perhaps, respondents 
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may feel pressure to provide positive answers or higher scores on measures (Chang, et al, 
2010).  Conversely, a rater’s recent negative interaction or experience with an organization 
(on a financial transaction like a billing mistake, for example), can negatively affect the 
rater’s impressions on unrelated dimensions leading the rater to assign low scores on all 
dimensions. In fact, Conway and Lance (2010) stated that the assumption that self-reported 
measures are routinely upward biased, is a common misconception thus necessitating the 
incorporation of both high and low rater bias in our research. We do expect that the rater 
bias will have a greater impact on the optimization model than the common method bias 
since the scores would shift more to the extremes of the scale with rater bias. With this 
background and understanding of biases in scorecard creation and to give fair consideration 
to the potential effect of scorecards on procurement decisions, we first create a scorecard 
model and then implement the hypothetical scorecards generated from this modeling 
exercise in our optimization model. 
We begin the modeling exercise by emulating a respondent’s thought process when 
they are presented with a scorecard - the goal being to first replicate the common method 
bias (i.e. replicate the rater’s perception of the interdependencies of dimensions and the 
carry over effect thereof ) and then add in the rater bias to generate scenarios with high or 
low vendor scores. We do not focus our attention on determining which particular 
dimension that has greatest carry-over, as the sample size is small and the choice of 
dominant dimension may change depending on the raters.  Since research indicates that 
most commonly, a rater’s perception of vendor performance is anchored in the relative cost 
of a vendor’s product (Kramer, 2015), we choose product price as our anchoring 
dimension. In this case a rater would rate every scorecard dimension relative to price. For 
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example, a rater may expect that expensive products would be higher in quality. Their 
scoring might reflect this perception i.e. higher price (indicated by a lower price score) 
would be followed by a higher quality score. Another model for capturing rater thinking, 
is one where the raters carry over their awareness of all prior ratings (not just the dominant 
dimension) as they assign ratings on successive dimensions. In such cases, the rater first 
identifies and rates the scorecard dimension most important to them. The raters will then 
consider performance on the next most important dimension and assign a grade, but the 
grade will be moderated by a carry-over effect from the previous dimension. This creates 
a hierarchy in the dimensions which is induced by the rater’s perception of the importance 
of the dimension.  Accordingly, dimensions lower in importance (in the rater’s view), 
would have lesser relative correspondence to the dominant dimension. In this approach, 
the influence of the dimensions can be accommodated by creating a weighted effect on all 
successive dimensions. We choose to simulate the first approach of rater thinking, where 
all scores are rooted in the relative price of a vendor’s product. This is done both for the 
simplicity of the model and anecdotal evidence indicating that price is the primary  driver 
even on non-financial performance metrics. Other models of scoring behaviors could of 
course result in similar scores.  Here we are just concerned with generating scores with 
different hypothetical correlation patterns and not with the psychological mechanisms 
involved.  
Once we induce common method bias in the scores using our price-dominant 
model, we next induce the rater score bias using a triangular distribution (minimum score 
of 1, modal score defined by a systematic and random component, and a maximum score 
of 5) with high and low fractiles to produce scorecards with higher and lower scores. 
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Finally, we run multiple replications of our scorecard simulator to illustrate how multiple 
raters participating in the scoring process may rate vendors on the scorecard. We use the 
average of scores from all raters to create a consolidated hypothetical scorecard for each 
vendor on each dimension for each product category.   
We next discuss a generalized form of the scoring model used and then describe 
the detailed implementation of our model and its results.  
4.3.5.1 Modeling the scoring process 
 
To model the scoring process, we assume that the rater is presented a blank 
scorecard similar in structure to the one shown in Figure 9. Figure 9 illustrates the scorecard 
for one category only. The rater would see such a scorecard for all categories. The vendor 
names here have been de-identified but the raters would see the actual vendor names, the 
pricing of product categories, and any other pertinent details. We assume the rater will 
assess performance across all vendors for each dimension for every category. For example, 
the rater would score all vendors on “price”, then score all vendors on “quality” etc across 
all categories. In our approach we assume the rater will score metrics from quality to 
service, with a reference to the price the vendor offers on their products. 
Figure 9 : Sample scorecard for rater input for one category 
 
 
Please rate the vendors on a scale of 1 to 5 on each of the dimensions for the following category
Category : ICD Single
Vendor Price Quality Innovation Operational Excellence Delivery Service
1
2
3
4
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To simulate this rater thinking, in our model, the scores are generated for every category 
and vendor on all six dimensions. This is achieved using a position ratio which determines 
the position of the score likely to be achieved relative to the maximum score on the scoring 
scale. Once we determine this position, a modal (or most likely achieved score) score for 
the triangular distribution is determined by having a systematic component caused by 
carry-over from an objective measure such as price or previous ratings plus a random 
component for rater perception. The triangular distribution with high or low fractiles allows 
us to generate scores that emulate the rater’s tendency to give a high or a low score. This 
actual score is generated once for every replication in the scoring model to impose an 
individual rater’s input on vendor score. 
For the scoring model, we define the following parameters: 
 𝛼1: Weight given to systematic influence of an objective metric for dimension 1 
𝛼𝑗: Weight given to carryover of systematic influence from dimension 1 to dimension j 
(1 - 𝛼𝑗): Complementary weight of random component 
j: index indicator for dimension being scored  
𝑚𝑎𝑥 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟: Maximum possible relative price factor (across all vendors and 
categories) 
𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 : Maximum achievable score on any dimension (In this scorecard, 𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 
= 5) 
𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 : Maximum achievable score on any dimension (In this scorecard, 𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 = 
1) 
unif [0, 1]: Uniform distribution between 0 to 1 
 
For every vendor v, category c, and replication r 
Position ratio for 𝑑𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗 where j= 1 (Price)  
 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑣𝑐= 𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑣𝑐/ 𝑚𝑎𝑥 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟   (19) 
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Price score is in the inverse of price ratio (Vendors with higher price get a lower score on 
cost competitiveness) 
Modal score for 𝑑𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗 where j= 1 (Price) 
 𝑑𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑐𝑜1  =  𝛼1 * (𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 – (𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 - 𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒) ∗ 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑣𝑐) + (1 - 
𝛼1) * (1+ unif [0,1]* (𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒- 𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 ))         (20) 
 
Position ratios for all remaining dimensions j=2 to m  
𝑑𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑗 = 𝛼𝑗 * (𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 −  𝑑𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑐𝑜1)/ 𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 + (1 - 𝛼𝑗) * unif 
[0,1]                (21) 
 
Modal scores for all remaining dimensions j=2 to m 
 𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑗= 1 + (𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 −  𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒)* 𝑑𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑗       (22) 
 
The detailed implementation of this model to generate hypothetical scorecards is described 
in subsection 4.3.5.2 
4.3.5.2 Creation of Hypothetical Vendor Scores for Model Testing  
 
Using these six metrics, the following steps are taken to create hypothetical scorecards: 
1. A correlation matrix is created for simple correlations judged likely to exist 
between ratings by asking for indications of the perceived degree of correlation that 
would result as a person assigns scores to a vendor in that order. (See Table 8 for 
example). 
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2. This correlation matrix in step 1 is used to determine the hierarchy of the 
dimensions (price being the dominant dimension). The sum of the absolute 
correlation coefficients is used to create the hierarchy.   
3. The model described in equations 18 – 21 is now implemented using the hierarchy 
identified in step 3 and using different 𝛼𝑗 values to induce common methods bias.  
4. The cumulative probability of the triangular distribution function is used to create 
rater bias toward low versus high fractiles for the scores. A graphical representation 
of the triangular distribution is shown in Figure 10. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5. Multiple replications (namely 5, 20, and 100) are run (to replicate input from 5, 20, 
and 100 different respondents) with lower fractile to generate 
multiple scorecard values which are then averaged to derive one 'low-biased' 
scorecard.  
6. A correlation matrix of the aggregated scores is generated from the replications to 
see if they followed the correlation patterns assumed in step 1. 
Lowest 
score = 1 
Highest 
score = 
5 
Most likely 
achieved score  
Figure 10: Triangular distribution function 
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7. Steps 5-6 are repeated with higher fractiles to generate a ‘high biased’ scorecard 
thus providing two scorecard structures, each representing the tendency of raters to 
score high or low. 
8. Finally, the high and low biased scorecard structures are used for testing the 
optimization model response to rater bias. 
 
Table 9 shows the scorecard dimensions used in this research. The judgmental correlations 
in the table were supplied by a supply chain manager at the healthcare system (Refer to 
step 1). The column sums of each dimension indicate the hierarchy of influence of the 
metrics. No negative correlations were assumed among the scorecard dimensions. With 
this particular rater’s input, Price (3.7) emerged as the most influential scorecard dimension 
(which validates our assumption of a dominant dimension). Followed by quality (3.4), 
innovation (3.2), operational excellence (2.7), delivery (2.4), and service (2.2).  
 
Table 9 : Hypothetical correlation matrix with rater input 
 
Price Quality Innovation Operational 
Excellence 
Delivery Service 
Price 1 0.8 0.7 0.5 0.4 0.3 
Quality 0.8 1 0.6 0.4 0.3 0.3 
Innovation 0.7 0.6 1 0.4 0.3 0.2 
Operationa
l Excellence 
0.5 0.4 0.4 1 0.2 0.2 
Delivery 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.2 1 0.2 
Service 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 1 
Sum  3.7 3.4 3.2 2.7 2.4 2.2 
Parimal Kulkarni 
University of Missouri, St. Louis 
 
86 
 
 
 
Using this dimensional hierarchy, Figure 11 shows the correlations that emerge on the high 
and low biased scorecards generated from 100 replications using the model described in 
equations 18 -20.  Note the difference in “price ratio” and “pricesco”. Price ratio indicates 
the relative cost index of a vendor for a category. “Pricesco” is the price score of the vendor 
for a category. A higher price ratio indicates a more expensive vendor for a category which 
leads to a lower price score. Figure 11 also provides details on the mean, minimum, and 
maximum score generated for each dimension. The range of the mean, minimum, and 
maximum score highlight the bias between the two scorecards. When common method bias 
is high, we get correlations that match closely with the input correlations, especially 
between price and other dimension. For example, the correlation between price and quality 
is assumed to be 0.8. As is seen in Figure 11, the correlation on the generated scorecard is 
0.7346. With a low common method bias scenario these correlations are significantly 
lower. The common method bias however does not seem to have a great effect on the range 
of scores generated. If the rater’s tendency is to give high scores then regardless of the 
common method bias, the range of scores is quite close. For example, the mean quality 
score is 3.53 with high common method bias and 3.58 with low common method bias. Note 
that the mean price score is 3.42 in both the common method bias scenarios. This is due 
the price score being an objective score that is derived from actual vendor price factors. 
Also note that for the high common method bias scenario, the standard deviations are lower 
since we make them agree most closely with the price score.  
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We do clearly see the effect of the rater’s tendency to assign high or low scores.  For 
example, on the high common method bias- high rater bias scorecard the minimum score 
on the price dimension is 3.2, with a maximum possible score of 3.7, and a mean score of 
3.4. While on the low biased scorecard the minimum score for price is 1.5, with a maximum 
possible score of 2.4, and a mean score of 1.9.   
To replicate the scoring process in an organization with fewer respondents, we show the 
correlations emerging from scores generated by 20 (Figure 12) and 5 (Figure 13) 
replications. The average scores are quite close in all three cases. Better correlations 
(compared to the hypothesized input in Table 8) emerge from scenarios with more 
replications – especially for dimensions lower in hierarchy. For the purposes of testing the 
effect of scores on the optimization model we use the scorecard generated from 100 
replications.  
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Figure 11: Correlations emerging from the scorecard generator (100 replications) 
 
Parimal Kulkarni 
University of Missouri, St. Louis 
 
89 
 
 
Parimal Kulkarni 
University of Missouri, St. Louis 
 
90 
 
 
Parimal Kulkarni 
University of Missouri, St. Louis 
 
91 
 
 
 
 
Parimal Kulkarni 
University of Missouri, St. Louis 
 
92 
 
Figure 12: Correlations emerging from the scorecard generator (20 replications) 
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Figure 13: Correlations emerging from the scorecard generator (5 replications) 
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The sample scorecards generated from these experiments were used for testing their effect 
on optimization model output. We discuss this testing in the optimization experiments 
chapter. 
 
4.3.6 Other procurement data 
Other relevant data regarding procurement and business processes were also gathered as 
part of this research. Particularly, information on previous quantity discounts (individual 
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purchase quantities and overall volume of business for the year) was collected. This was 
used to estimate a reasonable range of bulk buy and rebate parameters for the optimization 
model.  
The negotiation period for contracts was also researched. Currently, most contracts for bulk 
purchases are negotiated annually with purchase quantities stipulated for any given quarter.  
The data collection highlighted the various procurement business processes, systems, and 
decisions that need to be made by supply chain procurement managers in healthcare. The 
next section illustrates the use of this knowledge to generate data for testing the model and 
capturing the complexities of these decisions.  
Section 4.4 describes the model output generated using input data discussed in section 4.3. 
4.4 Model Testing Results 
 
With the data setup discussed in the previous sections, we now test the deterministic 
optimization model to see if it conforms with our axiomatic understanding of optimization 
model behavior and business processes. 
The MILP model is built using SAS 9.4 using the OPTMILP procedure as a solver. The 
OPTMILP procedure implements the linear-programming-based branch-and-cut algorithm 
(SAS Institute Inc., 2013.). This algorithm first relaxes the binary restrictions for the 
quantity discount indicators and then systematically explores different possible restrictions 
that force binary values where required.  When an integer feasible solution is acquired, it 
becomes a bench mark against which to evaluate other solutions.  The search is terminated 
when the gap between the objective function for the incumbent (best integer feasible 
solution to date) and any outstanding relaxation that could become integer feasible is 
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sufficiently small. The input data for the model are the product demands, scorecard data, 
and price, as described in the previous sections.  
Figure 14 shows a sample output from a single program run (Where all constraints are 
relaxed and minimum scorecard indices are zero). The model has 3,787 variables of which 
36 are binary variables. There are a total 7,157 constraints. 6,281 of which are less than or 
equal to constraints, 434 are equal to constraints, and 442 are greater than or equal to 
constraints. There are also 19,152 constraint coefficients. These constraints and 
coefficients are derived from the equations (1) – (15) for the relevant product, category, 
and vendor. The relative objective gap is 0.0001. 
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Figure 14 : Sample SAS proc OPTMILP output 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 10 shows a portion of a report for preferred and substitute product purchases. For 
example, product #4 is purchased as a substitute for product #41, #49, #86, #128, and #202. 
The relative price of 0.813 indicates that the unit price of product #4 is less than that of the 
products it substituted. The total demand for the product #1 as a preferred product was 22. 
Another 3 units were purchased to satisfy a portion of demand for product #41. Also 7 units 
of product #4 were purchased to satisfy a portion of demand for product #49, 2 units were 
bought to substitute #86, 4 units were purchased to substitute #128, and 13 units were 
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purchased to substitute #202 thus making the total quantity of product 4 purchased equal 
to 51.  
Table 10: Sample of substitutes and preferred product purchases results 
 
 
 
Table 11 shows a sample model report for a base case with maximum flexibility to reduce 
costs. The parameters are set as follows: 100 percent product level substitutability allowed, 
100 percent category level substitutability allowed, 100 percent max market share allowed, 
all scorecard minimum indices are zero.  
For this scenario, in category 1, the model recommends reducing vendor 4’s dollar market 
share (with the highest price index of 1.106) from 53.8% to 0%.  The purchasing volume 
is instead allocated to the more cost competitive vendors 1 (price index 0.87) and 2 (price 
index 0.99). However, for category 8, vendor 4’s dollar market share (with the price index 
of 0.96) is increased from 6.1% to 11.5%. The total demand of 4,925 units reflects the 
historic demand indicated in Table 5. This demand is satisfied by purchasing 1,441 units 
of preferred product purchases and 3,484 units of substitute products purchases. 
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Table 11: Sample model output with base case offering max savings 
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4.5 Model testing 
The purpose of model testing is to demonstrate how solutions from the optimizing model 
may vary in response to tightening and relaxation of various constraints. The results from 
the various model testing scenarios indicate that the deterministic model responds as 
expected to linear changes in parameter levels. The objective function value (which is a 
sum of the post rebate spend and any incurred scorecard penalties) increases as constraints 
are tightened and decreases as they are relaxed.  
Percentage cost savings, defined as the difference between past spend and current post 
rebate spend, is used as the metric to measure the sensitivity of the optimization model to 
the various parameter changes. Where applicable, vendor market shares are also used to 
illustrate model behavior.  
The effects of the model parameters, namely market share, substitutability (product 
level, pairwise, category level), scorecard dimensions, bulk buy rates, and rebate rates, are 
discussed in the next sections. To test the behavior of the model as parameters are changed, 
first all constraints are relaxed and only the parameter constraint under consideration is 
tightened to test the model’s behavior. The high-biased scorecard structure is used in the 
testing (note that when the minimum scorecards requirements are set to zero, the scorecard 
used is immaterial since all vendors are considered to be qualified). The next section shows 
the results of this model testing. 
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4.5.1 Effect of market share parameters 
Vendor market shares indicate what percent of the purchasing volume (either in terms of 
units or dollars) is allocated to each vendor. The market share constraint expressed in the 
model is defined in terms of the dollar value of purchases allocated to each vendor.  
To ensure diversification of supply, almost every vendor may be allocated some purchase 
volume. This is represented by a low maximum allowable market share parameter value 
(e.g. 25%, 30%). A sole-source market would be reflected in a scenario where maximum 
allowable market share is 100%. 
Axiom 1: For a given product-level substitution, decreasing the maximum market share 
decreases potential savings as the constraint becomes binding. 
The other model parameters are as follows: 
Bulk buy percentage = 10%; Rebate percentage = 10%; product, category, and pairwise 
substitutability = 100%; minimum scorecard indices = 0% 
Table 12 shows a comparison of purchase quantities allocated in a highly diversified 
scenario and in a sole-source scenario. When diversification is forced with the low market 
share parameter, vendors with higher price indices are allocated some purchase quantities 
driving up the overall purchase cost. For example, for category 1, the most expensive 
vendor (vendor 4) is allocated 11.4% of the market share when maximum allowable market 
share is 30%, but has no market share allocated to them when maximum allowable market 
shares are 100%. The effect of alternative constraints on market shares on total 
procurement cost is depicted in in Figure 16. 
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Table 12 : Variation in purchase quantities with varying market share 
 
 
 
Figure 15 shows the changes in percentage savings (savings calculated as the 
difference between post-rebate spend and past spend) as a result of varying the maximum 
allowable vendor market share. The savings range from 16.86% to 22.73% when the 
maximum allowable market share is varied from 30% (when market is highly diversified) 
to 100% (allowing sole sourcing). 
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Figure 15 : Effect of market share parameter 
 
 
Generally the savings decrease as maximum vendor market share decreases. Another 
interpretation of this result, is that vendor diversification comes at a cost – the trade-off in 
this case being a decrease in savings as vendor diversification is forced. An interesting 
observation is that the savings do not vary for market shares greater than 75%. This would 
indicate that there are no additional savings generated by allowing a sole source 
procurement strategy. Also, the savings generated by increasing maximum market share 
from 50% to 75% increase by only about 2%. However increasing market share from 30% 
to 50% increases savings by almost 32%. 
  
4.5.2 Effect of product level substitutability 
 
The product level substitutability parameter is used to indicate the degree of adherence to 
physician preference. 
22.73%
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Axiom 2: For a given max market share, decreasing the maximum allowable product level 
substitution decreases potential savings as the constraint becomes binding. 
The other model parameters are as follows: 
Bulk buy percentage = 10%; Rebate percentage = 10%; category, and pairwise 
substitutability = 100%; minimum scorecard indices = 0%  
Table 13 and Figure 16 show the changes in percentage savings as a result of varying the 
allowed percentage of substitutable products. The savings increase as allowed product 
substitutability increases. When estimating the cost of adhering to physician preference it 
is easy to see that physician inflexibility in allowing substitutions decreases potential 
savings. 
Table 13: Effect of product level substitutability on savings 
% product 
substitutability 
max market share % savings 
100 100 22.73% 
80 100 18.85% 
60 100 15.05% 
40 100 11.43% 
20 100 7.85% 
0 100 0.00% 
100 75 22.73% 
80 75 18.85% 
60 75 15.05% 
40 75 11.43% 
20 75 7.85% 
0 75 0 
100 50 22.24% 
80 50 18.83% 
60 50 14.95% 
40 50 11.06% 
20 50 7.60% 
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% product 
substitutability 
max market share % savings 
0 50 NFR 
100 30 16.86% 
80 30 15.72% 
60 30 13.3% 
40 30 NFR 
20 30 NFR 
0 30 NFR 
 
 
Figure 16: Effect of product substitutability and market share parameters 
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4.5.3 Effect of pairwise substitutability 
 
For demonstration purposes, we apply the same percentage limit on all possible pairwise 
substitutions to show the effect on model output. However, when using the model the 
pairwise limitations between a product and its substitutes can be individualized. 
Axiom 3: For a given max market share, decreasing the maximum allowable product level 
substitution decreases potential savings as the constraint becomes binding. 
The other model parameters are as follows: 
Bulk buy percentage = 10%; Rebate percentage = 10%; category, and product level 
substitutability = 100%; minimum scorecard indices = 0% 
Figure 17 shows that as maximum allowable pairwise substitutability decreases the savings 
decrease, with the effect being more pronounced at the lower substitutability percentages. 
The cost savings range from 0% at 0% pairwise substitution to 22.73% at 100% maximum 
allowable pairwise substitution. 
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Figure 17: Effect of (overall) pairwise substitution parameter 
 
Table 14 shows an example of the comparison of category level market shares for two of 
the pairwise substitutability examples. Note that the overall product level substitutability 
constraint has been relaxed by setting the overall substitutability to 100%. With the lower 
pairwise substitutability of 20%, market share of 25.3% is assigned to vendor 3 even 
though they are more expensive. Compared to the scenario where pairwise substitutability 
is 100%, the 20% substitutability scenario generates lesser savings because of this market 
share allocation. 
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Table 14: Comparison of category 1 for effect of pairwise substitutability 
Market share with maximum pairwise substitutability 20% 
 
Market share with maximum pairwise substitutability 100% 
 
 
Table 15 shows a comparison of the three structures for vendor substitutability discussed 
in section 4.4.1 i.e. Full substitution, partial substitution, and restricted substitution. As 
expected, the cost savings decrease as allowable substitutions are decreased. If full 
substitution between vendors is allowed as in Case A, savings as high as 26.82% can be 
achieved. Compared to Case A, with the restricted substitutions in Case C the maximum 
savings that can be achieved are only about 12%.  
Table 15: % Cost savings comparison for paired vendor substitutability 
Max allowable 
product level 
substitutability 
Max 
allowable 
marketshare 
Full 
Substitution 
Case A 
Partial 
Substitution 
Case B 
Restricted 
substitution 
Case C 
100 100 26.82% 22.73% 11.94% 
100 75 24.79% 22.73% 11.57% 
100 50 23.05% 22.24% 9.94% 
100 25 13.45% 13.41% infeasible 
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4.5.4 Effect of category level substitutability 
The category level substitutability determines the category level demand that can be 
satisfied by substitute products. This substitutability parameter can be varied for every 
product category. For illustrating the effect of the parameter, the same substitutability value 
is used for all nine categories.   
Axiom 4: For a given category level substitution, decreasing the maximum allowable 
category level substitution decreases potential savings as the constraint becomes binding. 
The other model parameters are as follows: 
Bulk buy percentage = 10%; Rebate percentage = 10%; product, and pairwise 
substitutability = 100%; minimum scorecard indices = 0% 
Figures 18 shows the increase in percentage savings as a result of increasing the maximum 
allowable category level substitution. The savings can vary from 0% for 0% maximum 
allowable substitution to 20.23% for 100% substitution. 
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Figure 18: Effect of category level substitutability parameter 
 
 
4.5.5 Effect of bulk buy requirements parameter 
The bulk-buy parameter represents the percentage increase in historic usage required to be 
eligible for meeting the quantity discount levels. With this method of defining bulk buy 
requirements, the required increase in usage is proportional to the historic usage (i.e. 
historic purchases from a vendor). This does pose the risk of requiring small increases for 
vendors with low historic usage and large increases for vendors with high historic usage. 
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Axiom 5: Increasing the bulk buy requirement decreases the potential savings as the 
constraint becomes binding. 
The other model parameters are as follows: 
Rebate percentage = 10%; product, category, and pairwise substitutability = 100%; 
Minimum scorecard indices = 0% 
The parameter range chosen is from 10% - 100%. Though the bulk buy parameter results 
are shown for a 100% increase in historic usage, increasing product usage by anything over 
50% requires a considerable amount of usage compliance and standardization. From 
observations, a 10% to 15% usage increase seems more realistic. Table 16 and Figure 19 
demonstrate the effect of market share variation with the bulk buy parameter. It is 
interesting to note, that when maximum vendor market share is 75% or higher, increasing 
the bulk buy parameter percentage offers no increase in savings. This is presumably 
because one vendor can own the entire market share and an increase in usage will not affect 
the quantity discount tiers that are already met. At low market shares and very high bulk 
buy percentage requirement, there is a sharp decrease in savings (See Table 15 market 
share 30 column).  
Table 16: Effect of bulk buy parameter on savings 
bulkbuypct max market 
share =100 
max market 
share = 75 
max market 
share = 50 
max market 
share = 30 
10% 22.7% 22.7% 22.2% 16.9% 
25% 22.7% 22.7% 22.0% 15.6% 
50% 22.6% 22.6% 21.9% 14.9% 
100% 22.1% 22.1% 20.8% 13.8% 
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Figure 19: Effect of bulk buy parameters on savings 
  
 
 
 
Table 17 shows market shares of vendors for a few sample cases of categories where 
quantity discounts were achieved.  The market shares values shown in bold indicate a 
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22.7% when bulk buy percentage changes from 10% to 25%. However the underlying 
market shares can change as seen for categories 7, 8, and 9. In general, in the absence of 
limits on market share, the business is always distributed to gain quantity discounts.  Even 
when the required bulk buy percentage increases to 100% (while the maximum allowable 
vendor market share is 100%) as seen in Case C, potential savings drop only slightly to 
22.1%, as seen in Table 16. Case D, however, shows the decrease in total number of 
categories where quantity discounts were achieved, when the requirement for the bulk buy 
(i.e. increase in purchases compared to previous purchases) is high and the allowable 
maximum vendor share is very low. Also notice in case D, the individual market shares are 
capped at 30% causing business to be distributed in such a way that quantity discounts 
cannot be achieved. Thus the resulting savings are also very low. This scenario of course 
provides more diversification of market shares. Another observation from Table 17, is the 
consistency of quantity discounts offered by vendor 1 in each case. As was seen in the table 
of relative cost indices (Table 4), vendor 1 is almost always the cheapest vendor for any 
category. It thus follows that in the absence of any requirements of scorecard performance, 
most of the purchases would be driven to vendor 1, and thus be eligible for quantity 
discounts. 
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Table 17: Vendors offering bulk buy discounts (Values in bold indicate a quantity 
discount category) 
 
Case A: bulk buy = 10%,  
max market share= 100%    
Case B:bulk buy = 25%, max market 
share= 100%   
Categories Vendors   Vendors 
 1 2 3 4   1 2 3 4 
1 29.3% 70.7% 0 0  1 29.3% 70.7% 0 0 
2 52.2% 47.8% 0 0  2 52.2% 47.8% 0 0 
3 40.1% 59.9% 0 0  3 40.1% 59.9% 0 0 
4 43.6% 51.9% 4.5% 0  4 43.6% 51.9% 4.5% 0 
5 58.1% 41.9% 0 0  5 58.1% 41.9% 0 0 
6 56.5% 43.5% 0 0  6 56.5% 43.5% 0 0 
7 32.1% 49.2% 0 18.7%  7 25.8% 55.6% 0 18.6% 
8 15.6% 72.8% 0 11.6%  8 17.7% 70.8% 0 11.5% 
9 58.6% 32.7% 8.7% 0  9 58.6% 32.7% 8.7% 0 
Count of 
categories  9 9 0 2   9 9 0 2 
 
Case C : bulk buy = 100%, 
max market share= 100%    
Case D: bulk buy = 100%, max market 
share= 30%   
Categories Vendors  Vendors 
 1 2 3 4   1 2 3 4 
1 29.3% 70.7% 0 0  1 28.6% 30% 30% 11.4% 
2 52.2% 47.8% 0 0  2 30% 30% 18.2% 21.8% 
3 40.1% 59.9% 0 0  3 30% 30% 30% 10% 
4 32.6% 62.9% 4.4 0  4 30% 30% 30% 10% 
5 58.1% 41.9% 0 0  5 30% 30% 15.2% 24.8% 
6 41.6% 58.4% 0 0  6 30% 30% 10% 30% 
7 39.4% 31.1% 0 29.5%  7 30% 30% 10% 30% 
8 0 84.8% 0 15.2%  8 30% 30% 10% 30% 
9 59.4% 32.6% 0 7.9%  9 30% 30% 15.4% 24.6% 
Count of 
categories 8 7 0 2   8 1 0 4 
 
4.5.6 Effect of rebate percentage parameters 
The rebate percentage parameter indicates what percentage of costs will be returned to the 
hospital post purchase once a quantity discount tier has been reached. Rebates are generally 
credited back to organizations annually.  
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Axiom 6: Increasing the rebate percentage increases the potential savings  
The other model parameters are as follows: 
Bulk buy percentage = 10%; product, category, and pairwise substitutability = 100%; 
Minimum scorecard indices = 0% 
The model is tested using the most commonly negotiated rebate percentages experienced 
in the last few years in the healthcare organization. Since the range of rebates offered were 
between 10% -20% of total purchase price, this range has been used to demonstrate the 
effect of the rebate parameters. It is entirely possible to negotiate larger rebates than 20% 
and it is possible that a supplier may offer a less than 10% rebate. However for the purposes 
of demonstrating the effect of the parameter, this range has been used. Table 18 and Figure 
20 shows the effect of varying the rebate percentage on the savings achieved. As expected, 
the higher the rebate percentage, higher are the possible savings achieved from the 
procurement process. 
Table 18: Effect of rebate parameters on savings 
rebate max market 
share =100% 
max market 
share = 75% 
max market 
share = 50% 
max market 
share =30% 
10% 22.7% 22.7% 22.2% 16.9% 
15% 27.0% 27.0% 26.5% 20.4% 
20% 31.3% 31.3% 30.8% 24.0% 
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Figure 20: Effect of rebate parameters on savings 
  
  
 
 
4.5.7 Model Testing Summary 
The purpose of this set of tests on the model is to confirm that the optimization model is 
appropriately sensitive to key parameters, namely, the minimum number of vendors 
required for supply diversity (defined by market share), minimum vendor scores required 
for each performance scorecard dimension, the rate of product, category, and the pairwise 
substitutability (which depends on flexibility of physicians to accept alternative devices or 
accessories in the same category), and bulk buy parameters for quantity discounts. As 
expected, when overall or pairwise product substitutability decreases the possible savings 
decreases. For the market share parameter, sole source scenarios (where there is no limit 
on market share) offer the highest savings. We notice the effect of parameter changes on 
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the underlying vendor market shares even when the changes in savings are not significant. 
When varying the bulk buy parameter, we find that that forcing diversification (i.e. 
allowing very low maximum allowable market shares) while also asking for an increase in 
product usage leads to fewer possible savings.  
Having confirmed that the optimization model responds as expected to constraint 
tightening and relaxing, we proceed to experiments that address our research questions. 
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5 Optimization Model Experiments 
 
With the optimization model validated in Chapter 4, we now implement the model to 
generate some scenarios that using parameters we expect to be realistically used in the 
business. We also discuss research questions 3 and 4 which pose inquiries regarding the 
effect of subjective scorecards and planning horizons on optimization model output. To 
that end we discuss experiments conducted using the optimization model in this chapter. 
We first discuss the effect of scorecard ratings in section 5.1 and then the effect of planning 
horizons in section 5.2. Finally, in section 5.3 we discuss savings generated using realistic 
parameter combinations. 
5.1 Effect of scorecard biases (common method and rater bias) 
 
In this section we first discuss the meaning and effects of scorecard minimums. The 
scorecard minimums stipulate the qualifying score that a vendor must earn to be chosen as 
a supplier for a product in a category. The scorecard minimum indices are one of the 
“levers” of the optimization model. In our research, we allow the model to incur penalties 
when vendor scores do not meet required minimum scores. The purpose of the penalties is 
to allow a solution to be generated from the MILP model for further resolution when 
conflicting constraints result from unachievable standards for a given set of vendor scores 
with stipulated market-share limits. We consider price to be the most important scorecard 
dimension and accordingly failure to meet the price score has the highest penalty associated 
with it. The penalty magnitudes are chosen to be large enough to ensure that its is never 
more advantageous to incur penalties instead of purchasing product. Without such 
precautions, the optimization model can inapproriately minimize total cost by incuring low 
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penalties and to avoid higher cost purchases. We acknowledge that the search for an 
optimal purchase plan in such instances may be terminated prematurely because the 
integrality solution  tolerance may be achieved relative at an objective value that is inflated 
by the constraint-violation penalties.  For that reason, we report those solutions as NFR 
(needing further resolution). Further experimentation would be needed to devise penalties 
that are meaningful in order to automate the resolution of conflicting constraints with 
reasonable goal hierarchies. This may require different integrality tolerances or solution 
tactics that would increase solution times. This work is outside the scope of this dissertation 
and is an avenue for further research.  
We present a few examples to demonstrate the impact of changing the required scorecard 
minima. Let us assume a scorecard was used where Vendor 4 for category 3 earned a price 
score of 1.6. If the minimum score requirement is 30% i.e. vendor score of at least 1.5 on 
all dimensions, vendor 4 would qualify to supply products in category 3. However if the 
minimum score requirement was raised to 35%, vendor 4 would not qualify (since the 
minimum score needed now would be 5*0.35 = at least 1.75). However to be able to satisfy 
demand, the optimization model would allow a penalty to be incurred on the Price (or Cost) 
dimension as shown in Table 20. In this solution 10% of the market share is being allocated 
to a sub-standard vendor (while violating the scorecard constraint for price). 
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Table 19: Example to illustrate effect of scorecard minima 
 
 
Another way to look at these minimums is from the point of view of the scorecard 
constraints listed in equations (5) to (10). Figure 21 shows sample average category level 
scores for vendor 1 on all six dimensions.   
Figure 21: Sample average scores for vendor 1 (category level) – low rater biased 
scores 
 
Per the scorecard constraints, for a vendor to qualify the weighted scores have to be greater 
than the minimum required scores. Figure 22 shows a comparison of the weighted scores 
Parimal Kulkarni 
University of Missouri, St. Louis 
 
127 
 
and the total quantities purchased from the vendor 1. For category  8, with minimum 
scorecard indices of 30%, 146 units of product were purchased from vendor 1. With 60% 
minimum however, there were no purchases for category 8 made from vendor 1.  
Figure 22 : Weighted scorecard report for vendor 1 
 
 
 
 
As another example, assume the scorecard minimum was increased to 90% of the 
maximum possible score (i.e, to 4.5). Note that the scorecards (and the scorecard minima) 
are imposed across all products purchased from a vendor – i.e., deficiencies on one 
product’s purchases may be offset by surpluses on another product category. Figure 23 
shows that for category 7, vendor 1 is the cheapest vendor. In this case regardless of the 
scorecard minimums, the model allocates purchases to the vendor 1 (by incurring penalties 
for the score deficiences in columns titled ‘price def’, ‘quality def’, ‘service def’, ‘innov 
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def’, ‘delivery def’, and ‘opex def’ shown in Figure 22). We report these solutions where 
penalties are incurred as “Needing Further Resolution”. However, we use this example to 
simply illustrate changes in market shares. For example in category 8, where vendor 1 is 
the most expensive vendor, vendor 1’s market share goes down from 15.6% to 0%. These 
are quite significant variations in market share in response to the changing scorecard 
minimums.  
Figure 23: Comparison of vendor market shares for category 7 and 8 
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The resulting vendor market shares are just one metric to measure the effect of parameters 
on the optimization model. The other metric is cost savings. As seen in Figure 24, the 
potential savings that can be earned when the scorecard minimums are 0% and 30% are 
very similar. When no scorecard minima are imposed, the vendor selection and resulting 
cost savings depend on maximum allowed market share and maximum level of product 
substitutability. The range of savings that can be earned with 0% and 30% scorecard 
minimums is 7.6% to 22.73%. This is with maximum allowed market share and product 
substitutability set at 100%. 
The other model parameters used to generate the graph in Figure 24 are as follows: 
Bulk buy percentage = 10%; Rebate percentage = 10%; product, category, and pairwise 
substitutability = 100% 
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Figure 24: Effect of scorecard minimums on % savings 
 
  
In summary, scorecard minimums affect the size of the set of vendors that the optimization 
model may choose qualifying vendors from. Even when there are no pronounced changes 
in savings we see significant changes in underlying market shares in response to changes 
in scorecard requirements. 
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5.1.1 Discussion of common method bias on scorecard structures 
 
As discussed earlier, common method bias drives the correlations among the various 
scorecard dimensions. It does not however cause much variation in the scores themselves. 
The real driver behind variations in scores is the rater’s bias toward giving high or low 
scores. See for example, in Figure 25, the high scores for vendor 1 with high common 
method bias on the first four dimensions are 3.5 and service score is 3.6. With low common 
method bias, the scores for the dimensions ranging from price to service are 3.5, 3.6, 3.5, 
3.8, 3.7, and 3.8 respectively. Thus the scores produced are quite close to each other 
regardless of the potential common method bias. 
Figure 25 : Example of comparison of scorecards emerging from different common 
method biases 
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Since the scorecards emerging from the two common method biases are so similar, they do 
not have a pronounced effect on the optimization output. See Table 21 for a comparison of 
the savings generated using the two different scorecard structures. The savings are 
comparable in all scenarios except for when the maximum allowable market share is 100%. 
This advantage is probably achieved due to small score differences in price competitive 
vendors. 
Table 20: Comparison of savings for High (HCMB) and Low (LCMB) Common 
Method Bias 
pctsub max market 
share 
% Save 
(HCMB) 
% Save 
(LCMB) 
100% 30% 16.9% 16.9% 
80% 30% 15.7% 15.7% 
60% 30% 13.3% 13.3% 
40% 30% NFR NFR 
20% 30% NFR NFR 
0% 30% NFR NFR 
100% 50% 22.2% 22.2% 
80% 50% 18.8% 18.8% 
60% 50% 15.0% 15.0% 
40% 50% 11.4% 11.1% 
20% 50% 7.8% 7.6% 
0% 50% NFR NFR 
100% 75% 22.7% 22.7% 
80% 75% 18.9% 18.9% 
Parimal Kulkarni 
University of Missouri, St. Louis 
 
133 
 
pctsub max market 
share 
% Save 
(HCMB) 
% Save 
(LCMB) 
60% 75% 15.0% 15.0% 
40% 75% 11.4% 11.4% 
20% 75% 7.8% 7.8% 
0% 75% 0.0% 0.0% 
100% 100% 22.7% 22.7% 
80% 100% 18.9% 22.7% 
60% 100% 15.0% 22.7% 
40% 100% 11.4% 20.3% 
20% 100% 7.8% 7.8% 
0% 100% 0.0% 0.0% 
NFR – Needs further resolution 
 
 
5.1.2 Effect of High and Low Rater Bias 
 
To illustrate the effect of high low rater bias we reference the scorecard minimum case 
presented in Table 22. At 40% scorecard minimum, the optimization model using high 
scores does not incur penalties while the model using low scores does.  
Table 21 : Scorecard minimum chosen for experimentation 
scorecard minimum 
percentage 
requirements 
Optimization Model 
Solution status with 
Rater Bias Towards 
High Scores 
Optimization 
Model 
Solution 
status with 
Rater Bias 
Towards 
Low Scores 
Score (1-5 scale) 
0  No Penalties - Feasible  No Penalties 
- Feasible 
0 
20  No Penalties - Feasible  No Penalties 
- Feasible 
1 
30  No Penalties - Feasible  No Penalties 
- Feasible 
1.5 
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scorecard minimum 
percentage 
requirements 
Optimization Model 
Solution status with 
Rater Bias Towards 
High Scores 
Optimization 
Model 
Solution 
status with 
Rater Bias 
Towards 
Low Scores 
Score (1-5 scale) 
40  No Penalties - Feasible Penalties – 
NFR* 
2 
50  No Penalties - Feasible Penalties – 
NFR* 
2.5 
60  No Penalties - Feasible Penalties – 
NFR* 
3 
65 Penalties - Not Feasible Penalties – 
NFR* 
3.25 
*NFR – Needs further resolution 
 
Table 23 shows a comparison in savings achieved from the low and high rater bias 
scorecards. As expected, the model using lower scores generates fewer savings since the 
qualifying vendor pool is smaller (given that they did not earn the scores required to be 
selected). 
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Table 22: Effect of high - low rater bias on optimization model output (Scorecard 
minimum = 40%) 
pctsub max market 
share  
% Save (High 
Rater Bias) 
% Save (Low Rater 
Bias) 
100% 30% 17% 11% 
80% 30% 16% 11% 
60% 30% 13% 10% 
40% 30% NFR NFR 
20% 30% NFR NFR 
0% 30% NFR NFR 
100% 50% 22% 20% 
80% 50% 19% 17% 
60% 50% 15% 14% 
40% 50% 11% 10% 
20% 50% 8% 6% 
0% 50% NFR NFR 
100% 75% 23% 22% 
80% 75% 19% 18% 
60% 75% 15% 14% 
40% 75% 11% 10% 
20% 75% 8% 6% 
0% 75% 0% 0% 
100% 100% 23% 22% 
80% 100% 19% 18% 
60% 100% 15% 14% 
40% 100% 11% 10% 
20% 100% 8% 5% 
0 100% 0% 0% 
NFR – Needs further resolution 
 
Similar to the effects of the scorecard minimums, we again note that subjective scores (with 
their inherent biases) may affect vendor market shares when their effects are jointly 
considered with rater biases.  
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5.1.3 Summary of scorecard effects 
 
The purpose of this section was twofold – to test the optimization model response to 
varying scorecard minimums and to demonstrate the effect of common method and rater 
bias on the procurement model. 
For the first part, we find that upon varying scorecard minimums, we see dramatic change 
in market shares for vendors, where a vendor’s market share may drop to zero based on the 
subjective scores assigned to them.  
For the second part, we see that common method bias produces very similar scorecard 
structures and thus results in very similar savings generated by the optimization model. 
The rater’s perception of the hierarchy and carryover effects of dimensions does not cause 
much variation in the actual scores generated. In a scenario with just a few raters, 
scorecards can be affected substantially by individual raters’ tendency to give higher or 
lower scores than average. In this case average scores for raters converge more quickly to 
their true averages than correlations due to common method variance converge to their true 
values.  Regardless, effects of common method variance were found to be minor compared 
to rater biases toward high or low scores. The rater’s bias towards assigning low or high 
scores relative to the norms chosen for the scorecard constraints lead to very different 
scorecard and resulting procurement patterns.  
5.2 Effect of Planning Period 
 
Research question 4 explores the sensitivity of solutions to the planning period. Bulk 
purchases are often made to coincide with fiscal planning periods like annual purchases or 
quarterly purchases. The frequency with which these purchases are made determines how 
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much buffer stock is available in the supply chain. Longer planning periods may result in 
larger buffer stocks. Further there may be seasonality and unanticipated demand variations 
especially during longer planning periods. To investigate these effects, we consider three 
illustrative cases.  
• Case A: Create an annual purchasing plan using expected annual demand 
• Case B: Create a quarterly purchasing plan using expected demand derived from 
annual data 
• Case C: Create a quarterly purchasing plan using expected demand data for the 
relevant quarter 
Table 24 shows the demand aggregation for each case. This demand information is used to 
as input to the optimization model. 
Table 23: Total Demand 
 Quarter 
  1 2 3 4 
Case A Annual demand (𝐴𝐷𝑐) 4925 
Case B Derived Demand 
(𝐴𝐷𝑐/4) 
1231.25 1231.25 1231.25 1231.25 
Case C Quarterly demand (𝑄𝐷𝑐) 1116 1170 1392 1247 
 
Other model parameters are set as follows: 
Maximum market share =100%, Bulk buy percentage = 10%; Rebate percentage = 10%; 
product, category, and pairwise substitutability = 100%; minimum scorecard indices = 0% 
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Table 25 shows the category level output from the optimization model for Case A with 
actual annual demand.  As expected the total demand for 4925 products is satisfied as seen 
in column titled “Total Qty”.  
Table 24: Case A (Annual Purchase Plan) optimization model output 
 
Table 26 shows the category level output from the optimization model for Case B with 
quarterly demand derived as a fourth of the annual demand.  Again the model satisfies 
demand with no extra purchases. The inferred annual total demand is 4925 units. 
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Table 25: Case B (Derived Quarterly Demand) optimization model output 
 
 
Table 27 shows the category level output from the optimization model for Case C using 
actual quarterly demand. Notice the historical demand is almost evenly distributed through 
all four quarters of the year.  As expected the total demand for products is satisfied in 
accordance with the actual demand as seen in column titled “Total Qty”, with no excess 
purchases. The inferred total demand is 4925 units.  
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Table 26: Case C (Actual Quarterly demand) Optimization output 
Quarter 1 Quarter 2 
 
 
Quarter 3 Quarter 4 
  
  
Table 28 shows that the possible potential savings that can be achieved with all three 
planning periods are identical.  
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Table 27: % Savings comparison in various planning periods 
Case Savings 
A (Annual Demand) 23% 
B (Derived Quarterly Demand) 23% 
C (Actual Quarterly Demand) 23% 
  
 
However, it is interesting to note the fluctuations in underlying market shares with the 
changing planning periods as seen in the example presented in Table 29. Vendor 1’s current 
unit market share can fluctuate anywhere from 27% to 61.7% depending on the planning 
period used. This seasonality in demand (seen in Figure 29 scenarios where actual quarterly 
data is used) should be taken into account when negotiating bulk buy (i.e. quantity 
discount) terms. 
Table 28: Demonstration of changing market shares for Vendor 1 in Category 5 
with different planning periods 
Case Using Historic Unit 
Share 
Current Unit 
Share 
Historic 
Dollar Share 
Current 
Dollar 
Share 
Annual Demand 5.7 61.7 4.6 58.1 
Derived Qtr 
Demand 
5.7 61.7 4.6 58.1 
Actual Q1 Demand 6.3 30.5 5.1 25.9 
Actual Q2 Demand 6.3 27 5.1 6.4 
Actual Q3 Demand 6.9 29.7 5.5 7.2 
Actual Q4 Demand 3.9 21.7 3.1 17.6 
 
5.2.1 Summary of planning period effects 
 
The comparison of these three cases highlights that irrespective of the planning period used 
to accumulate the demand, the MILP model suggests purchase quantities to exactly satisfy 
demand with no excess purchases. Thus the savings generated in all three cases of demand 
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aggregation are nearly identical due to the almost even distribution of demand through all 
four quarters. There may be instances where rounding the demand quantities for a season 
may generate excess purchases in the final result. We acknowledge that the method of 
deriving demand may affect how closely it resembles the actual demand. The seasonality 
of the demand can cause variations in underlying vendor market shares. It may also pose a 
challenge in reaching the expected quantity discount levels every quarter (if there are 
periods with extremely low demand). While the product categories used here have almost 
even demand throughout the quarter, other product categories may have significant 
variation in demand. This variation could be ever more pronounced if the demand is 
aggregated at monthly intervals instead of quarters. Hence if quarterly data are used to 
negotiate contracts, the bulk buy levels and discount terms should be determined for that 
particular quarter.  
5.3 Implementation of the optimization model using realistic parameters 
 
Using our knowledge about the business setting we present the joint effects of various 
constraints and realistic parameter values on the savings and market shares. We expect that 
to leverage quantity discounts, the healthcare system may want to limit vendor market 
shares to a maximum of 40%. We also expect that they may allow some substitution 
(compared to current substitutions at 0%). We thus use an overall product substitutability 
of 35% in our scenarios and a category level substitutability of 20%. To model some 
pairwise substitution restrictions, we do consider some cases where vendor pairwise 
substitutions are not allowed at all. However when we do allow these pairwise 
substitutions, we allow an 80% pairwise substitution level. We do this with the assumption 
that implementing product substitution strategy would need allowances for a higher overall 
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pairwise substitution. We experiment with two bulk buy levels - 10% and 25%. The 
scorecard constraints are relaxed for the results presented in this section. Table 19 shows 
the changes in market shares under the two bulk buy scenarios, with joint considerations 
of the various constraints. As expected, the savings with the higher bulk buy requirements 
are slightly lower (9% savings with a 10% bulk buy requirement and 8% savings with 25% 
bulk buy requirements). Notice the significant decrease in savings under these realistic 
parameter values compared to the high savings of nearly 23% achieved by the model 
without these considerations. The total count of categories in which quantity discounts are 
offered are also lower with the 25% bulk buy requirement vs the 10% bulk buy 
requirement. Notice that the model still allocates purchases to all four vendors allowing 
enough supply diversity but dampening the magnitude of achievable savings.  
Table 29: Scenarios using realistic parameters (max market share= 40%, 
rebate=10%, category substitution = 20%, product substitution =35%, pairwise 
substitution=80%) 
 
Case A: bulk buy = 10%, 
savings attained = 9%  
Case B: bulk buy = 25%,  savings 
attained 8% 
Categories Vendors   Vendors 
 1 2 3 4   1 2 3 4 
1 12% 30% 23% 35%  1 12% 25% 26% 37% 
2 16% 27% 34% 23%  2 17% 30% 36% 17% 
3 8% 19% 36% 37%  3 8% 19% 37% 36% 
4 14% 34% 25% 27%  4 18% 40% 26% 16% 
5 20% 17% 40% 23%  5 18% 20% 40% 22% 
6 20% 31% 33% 16%  6 14% 34% 33% 19% 
7 12% 35% 39% 14%  7 16% 40% 23% 21% 
8 33% 21% 40% 6%  8 30% 24% 40% 6% 
9 37% 21% 28% 14%  9 37% 24% 31% 8% 
Count of 
categories  9 8 2 4   9 8 1 2 
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6 Discussion, Conclusions, and Managerial Implications 
 
The primary purpose of chapters 4 and 5 has been to discuss the optimization model 
formulation, data structures used, results of model testing, and experimentation in response 
to research questions one through four. We discuss the research questions and the overall 
conclusions in this chapter. 
 
Q1:  What is the expected cost of adhering strictly to physicians’ preferences on product? 
 In response to research question 1, the MILP model testing demonstrates that 
physician preference decreases the magnitude of potential savings in the supply chain. 
Though this is axiomatic, the results of the optimization model quantitatively capture the 
effect of physician preference. Depending on the scorecard minimums and maximum 
allowable market share, bulk buy requirements, and rebate levels, the expected cost of 
strictly adhering to physician preference can be translated as a change in savings anywhere 
from 5% to 22% (with lower savings achieved when adherence to physician preference is 
highest). This certainly illustrates the potential savings to be attained if physicians were 
engaged in the process of standardized product utilization and procurement. 
 
Q2: What is the expected cost of forcing diversification among vendors as a risk mitigation 
strategy? 
Forcing diversification results in higher procurement costs and lower possible 
savings. The loss of savings are seen as the expected cost of forcing vendor diversification. 
However, maintaining diversity of supply by forcing diversification helps reduce the 
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supply disruption risks associated with single sourcing. It should be noted that changes in 
allowed market share for a vendor have nonlinear effects on procurement costs.  With the 
MILP model, tradeoffs between cost and vendor concentration can be explored in depth.  
The final decision regarding the use of diversification as a risk mitigation strategy lies with 
the organizations using the model. The tolerance for risk may vary by planning periods or 
even over categories being negotiated. The optimization model should be used to generate 
various scenarios to investigate the risk – cost tradeoffs. 
 
Q3: What is the effect of subjective scorecards on procurement processes? 
The use of subjective balanced scorecards in the determination of the procumbent 
strategy emerged as an extremely important consideration for this research. We find that 
using subjective scorecards as ex-ante considerations in an MILP model can present certain 
risks related to fluctuating market shares and savings. Minor changes in these requirements 
can cause major variations in the resulting procurement model in terms of vendor selection, 
vendor market shares, and recommended purchase quantities for individual products. 
 We find that underlying biases in the scorecard process can result in different 
scorecard structures. Especially when the rater pool is small, it may be difficult to 
accurately capture the vendor’s performance. We find that the tendency of raters to give 
high or low scores is likely to have a much greater effect on procurement strategies than 
correlations in ratings due to common methods bias. Thus rater bias has a much more 
pronounced effect in shaping the procurement strategy than the common method bias. 
Seeing as these scorecards are subjective and may be influenced by the perception of 
vendors or vendor- physician relationship, the scorecard and business review process must 
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be carefully planned with enough checks and balances to ensure its fairness and selection 
of relevant standards. 
 
Q4: How would procurement strategies and purchasing costs change if contracts were 
negotiated on an annual basis instead of a quarterly basis? 
From the comparison of optimization outputs for various planning periods we notice 
that there is no difference in the total quantity to be purchased, regardless of the planning 
period used. We reiterate our assumption that the demand here does not consider the 
seasonality of purchases (unlike actual demand which does account for seasonality). 
Depending on the demand used, we demonstrate the effects of seasonal variations on the 
underlying vendor market shares. The organization would need to consider these seasonal 
effects when monitoring progress toward quantity discount targets. This presents an 
excellent use case for a simulation model which could be employed to test alternative 
purchasing strategies with consideration of stochastic effects. Using naïve methods of 
deriving quarterly demand where annual demand is simply divided over the quarters and 
then rounded up, may inflate the demand. In such cases there is a chance that excess 
purchases may occur when quarterly demand derived from actual demand is used. If in the 
future the procurement teams decide to include administrative costs associated with 
contract negotiations in their analysis, it may prove beneficial to negotiate one annual 
contract even with some excess inventory in the system. Especially, if a central warehouse 
is already available there may be no incremental capital costs to store the buffer inventory. 
There may be handling and storage costs but given the magnitude of quantity discounts, 
this may be a favorable trade off.  
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6.1 Conclusion and Managerial Implications for Healthcare Procurement 
 
From an analytical modeling perspective, we examined the use of MILP models 
and their sensitivity to various parameters used in the design of strategic procurement 
policies. During the model testing process, we observed the sensitivity of the optimization 
model solutions to small changes in cost and other important parameters that may result in 
alternative optimal (or near-optimal) solutions. We caution the users that purchasing 
patterns generated by a deterministic optimizing model can change greatly without 
necessarily changing the total cost. Hence care must be taken to compare current costs and 
market shares with suggested costs and market shares to avoid unnecessary disruptions 
with suppliers. Clarifying the relevant range of parameters used helps contextualize the 
results derived from the MILP models. As discussed in the previous section, with a realistic 
set of parameter combinations, the savings can drop dramatically to about 8% (compared 
to a fully relaxed model savings of 20%). A model like this can be used by practitioners 
for planning purposes in preparation for contract negotiations. This procurement model 
helps with supplier selection and trying various scorecard minima can produce different 
portfolios in a matter of few minutes. We recommend that the users of this tool do the same 
with other parameters such a bulk percentages, and rebates to establish a range of possible 
procurement costs.  In conjunction with discussions with physicians, these scenarios can 
demonstrate the change in costs in response to changes in procurement parameters. This 
type of analytical flexibility makes the model user friendly. We do caution the user that 
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this is a deterministic model and thus issues of stochasticity of demand are deferred for 
future work and extension of the model.  
From the perspective of conducting applied research, we learned that as an academic 
studying a supply chain problem the first step is to recognize the sources of cost, variation, 
risk, and savings opportunities in the relevant business processes (This is of course true 
from a managerial perspective as well). Some of these sources are specific to the business 
setting. In our research physician preference was one such source of risk and cost, vendor 
diversity was another. This specific knowledge can only be gained through interactions 
with the practitioners themselves. Combining this business knowledge with theories and 
techniques from academia helps build a usable research tool. 
From a managerial/ practitioner perspective, this research provides direction on 
designing procurement plans that will help minimize the overall purchase cost while 
recognizing the various risks in the business processes. Effective purchasing professionals 
must know what they’re buying, how it will be used, and which business process factors 
affect the organization’s cost. Healthcare supply chains face a challenge of ever increasing 
costs. Standard methods of generating savings opportunities with commodity products can 
only yield low impact savings. To fundamentally change healthcare procurement, buy-in 
is needed from physicians in determining how product utilization is designed and 
standardized. It must also be acknowledged that changing market shares may have an 
impact on the relationship of the hospital and vendor. Vendors who lose market share 
(either due to the decisions made to ensure diversification or due to their poor performance) 
may not be motivated to offer the same financial discounts for the next purchasing 
initiative. This may especially pose a problem since the same vendors tend to offer products 
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for different product families. It is not uncommon for larger vendors (often referred to as 
“elite vendors”, “preferred suppliers” or “first tier supply partner”) to challenge the scores 
being assigned to them, particularly when they are lower than expected. Justification for 
the scores being assigned can be provided as long as a fair score measurement system is 
implemented. Thus, implementing a dynamic procurement strategy which changes with 
every periodic contract negotiation should include clear communication with vendors 
about their performance and selection criteria. Supply-chain managers using this MILP 
model for procurement might wish to dampen changes in market share that might occur in 
pursuit of short-run cost savings – especially if alternative solutions with market shares 
closer to historical or managerially preferred values for individual vendors do not differ 
substantially in total cost from the MILP solution.  In order to sustain vendor relationships, 
managers should consider limiting sharp shifts in market share. In other words, the MILP 
solution should not be implemented mechanistically. Additional constraints could be added 
with limits on or penalties for changes in market share from target (historical or preferred) 
values. 
This dissertation brings to light these complexities and interactions of typical 
considerations in healthcare procurement such as physician preference, vendor 
diversification, and supplier performance. The interactions of these factors have not been 
studied in academia before. We recognize that the phenomenon of physician preference for 
products driven either by favorable patient outcomes, necessary specialized training, or 
valued technical support from the manufacturers, has always been an implicit consideration 
in healthcare procurement. However there are potential cost savings (or even improvement 
in clinical outcomes (not under consideration in this research) that may be derived from 
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flexibility as well. Needed was a mechanism to demonstrate to physicians the cost of their 
product preferences. Though we may never be able to completely eliminate physician 
preference from a healthcare supply chain, we can certainly show the range of cost savings 
that may be achieved by increasing their usage flexibility. As more physicians become 
involved in the administrative side of healthcare, their buy-in should become easier to 
obtain.  
  Our results highlight some of risks in healthcare procurement, particularly the risk 
of using subjective scorecards to measure vendor performance. We recommend 
recognizing rater bias in scorecard processes and guarding against it. Using multiple raters 
to score vendors might mute the effects of bias. Also creating scorecards that have weighted 
sub metrics that constitute a higher level metric might mute the effect of rater bias. If 
possible, the rating process should be conducted multiple times a year to guard against 
recency bias.  We do however recognize that contracts are negotiated only at certain time 
intervals. Conducting a scorecard exercise just for that particular contract may not be fair 
or robust enough. Scorecard processes should be implemented with two goals in mind – 
improving vendor relationships throughout the year and measuring vendor performance for 
a particular contract negotiation.  
Finally, we acknowledge the need of healthcare procurement to diversify the supply 
sources by managing vendor market shares as a means to manage risk. Though this limits 
opportunities for cost savings it is important to ensure multiple viable sources of supply 
are available at reasonable cost. The recent natural disasters such as the 2017 hurricane in 
Puerto Rico, have shown how easily supply of essential medications can be disrupted. The 
cost of overcoming such disruptions is too high and necessitates supply diversification.  To 
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ensure this supply diversification, it is essential to have a set of suppliers available as 
partners to support the surplus need of the organization. The scorecard process should help 
highlight a set of consistently high performing vendors. Their willingness to co-operate in 
such situations should be captured in their performance review. Interestingly, it may be 
difficult to find willing supplier partners if they have recently been rated poorly on their 
performance. This highlights again how subjective scorecard processes may have a 
lingering effect on business process and may in fact impede effective decision making. 
In the process of this research, we have discovered that healthcare procurement is 
much more complex than contract negotiations. There are behavioral factors that have to 
be considered in healthcare procurement. With this research we provide guidelines for 
consideration of these factors. 
6.1.1 Discussion of results with healthcare organization 
 
The results from this research were presented to the leadership team at the healthcare 
organization. We received a positive response on the application and implications of this 
research. The team acknowledged the importance of this research in recognizing (and 
analytically modeling) the conflicting goals of maintaining physician preference, sourcing 
diversity, and achieving cost savings, that healthcare procurement professionals must deal 
with. The team acknowledged that the tool designed here allows them to demonstrate to 
physicians various scenarios of procurement constraints and costs. They also appreciated 
the results of the scorecard related research and the highlights regarding the caution that 
must be exercised in using scorecards during the procurement process. The feedback 
received on the implementation of this research was mainly focused on how product usage 
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(and relevant purchases) may be standardized through discussions with physicians. The 
team expressed considerable interest in simulation models for studying the effect of process 
and demand (i.e. medical procedures) variability on quarterly or yearly procurement plans 
and on the implementation of the quantity discount terms. Another area of interest that 
emerged during the discussion, was the definition of product categories and the possible 
application of machine learning techniques that may be utilized for the better clustering of 
product categories.  
 
6.2 Limitations  
Analytically, the optimization model provides a basic deterministic solution to the 
strategic procurement problem described in this chapter. Typical to optimization models, 
our model is sensitive to small changes in cost and other important parameters. This 
deterministic model also focuses on the procurement side of the business which means we 
do not consider operational limitations such as storage space, inventory replenishment rules 
etc. We assume that any bulk quantity purchased by the organization can be stocked and 
consumed within the current infrastructure. Also note that this model only uses purchasing 
cost in its objective function. Costs of the total system such carrying costs, administrative 
costs etc. are not considered here.  
From a managerial/ practitioner perspective this modeling and analysis demonstrates 
to the decision maker the effects of various parameters in the business process, while giving 
them the ability to adjust the various parameters to test alternative policy scenarios. It does 
not account for the uncertainties or “fuzziness” associated with parameters of product cost 
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or market shares. The deterministic model also does not help account for the variations 
encountered in implementing the procurement plan.  
In our model, we assume product demands to be independent. For a large family of 
products that have a dependent demand (with a bill of materials), this model assumption 
may be inappropriate. In those cases, the model should consider the differentiation of 
demand in the parent product (which will have independent demand) and component 
products (with their dependent demand). 
We employ one possible structure of vendor and product substitutions in our model. 
There are other models of product substitution (especially with dependent demands) that 
may be employed depending on the pairwise substitution imposed.  
 
6.3 Future Work 
The dissertation illustrates a potential solution to make procurement processes more 
holistic by incorporating non – financial considerations in an optimization model. We now 
discuss the opportunities to expand upon this work for fruitful future research.  
The model presented here is deterministic. From a risk-management perspective, we 
acknowledge the need to consider operational issues that may be encountered when 
implementing procurement plans given the normal variations that occur in the daily 
running of a healthcare supply chain and in the event of significant supply-chain 
disruptions. We can expect variations in procedure types, patient census, and product 
usage, all of which would result in deviations from the cumulative expenditures with 
vendors. This mismatch with the negotiated bulk buy amounts may prevent the hospital 
from qualifying for quantity discounts. This calls for a complementary simulation model 
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in which stochastic variation in medical procedures may be imposed and rules for adjusting 
purchasing plans may be tested. An even more detailed operational simulation model can 
be designed with consideration of appropriate reorder points, safety stock levels, and lead 
times for various inventory locations in the supply chain. 
There is opportunity to expand this work for multi-period applications of the MILP 
model. It is not unreasonable to expect that for, multi-period models, the set of vendors 
under consideration and terms for bulk-buy discounts may change over time. One might 
investigate “steady-state” behavior of procurement plans under different assumptions 
about how supply-chain participants may respond to the business they receive in successive 
periods.  Of specific interest is the type of contract terms that may emerge for future 
quantity discounts after a recent period’s purchasing experience. 
In this work we assume only a single quantity discount tier.  Vendors may offer 
multiple tiers for quantity discounts. The MILP model presented here can accommodate 
such expansion by employing appropriate binary indicators for incremental discount tiers 
(which would change this model to a tiered pricing model). Also, the bulk buy for quantity 
discounts need not be defined as the percentage increase over current spend, as we have 
implemented here. Alternative methods for achieving quantity discounts with price breaks 
for a fixed quantity or a fixed dollar amount (sometimes referred to as “capped pricing” 
models) may be used.  This would of course lead to different market shares than the ones 
suggested by the current model.  
Alternative penalties in the optimization model may be used to alter the character of  
of solutions. It may be possible  to determine meaningful penalty magnitudes which would  
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for automated resolution of conflicting constraints accoding to a hierachy of goals. This 
may require different integrality tolerances or solution tactics that would increase solution 
times. This is an avenue for further research. 
Lastly, in this research we assumed that product usages were independent of one 
another.  Using statistical forecasting techniques that consider product interdependencies 
and seasonality in medical procedures, we may generate projections of product use which 
would alter the procurement strategies somewhat. The testing of such effects with a 
combination of optimization and simulation   would be an interesting refinement. 
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